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I. INTRODUCTION
he asset forfeiture laws allow the government to bring a civil
action to confiscate-or "forfeit"-property derived from, or
used to commit, a criminal offense.1 Historically, because the
civil action was filed in rem, the only issue in the forfeiture case was
whether there was an adequate nexus between the property and the offense;
if the property was derived from or used to commit the offense, it was
subject to forfeiture regardless of who the owner of the property might have
been, or whether the owner took part in, or even was aware of, the offense
when it occurred.
Property owners challenged the civil forfeiture laws on the ground that
they did not adequately protect the rights of innocent property owners. In
Bennis v. Michigan,2 however, the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment do not protect property owners from the forfeiture of
their property, when the property was used to commit a criminal offense,
even if the property owner had no knowledge of, and did not consent to, the
illegal use of the property.
The Bennis decision meant that Congress and state legislatures were
free to enact civil forfeiture laws subjecting property to confiscation by the
There is no general authority to forfeit property in connection with a federal
crime. To the contrary, forfeiture must be authorized on a statute-by-statute basis.
See, for example, 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2000), which authorizes forfeiture
of the "proceeds" of more than 100 crimes, including all of the most common
offenses. Forfeiture of"facilitating property" or "property involved in the offense"
is authorized for a smaller but significant number of offenses, including drug
trafficking, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (6)-(7) (1994), and money laundering, 18
U.S.CA. § 981(a)(1)(A).2 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
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government when it was used in connection with a wide variety of criminal
offenses-from soliciting prostitution and driving while intoxicated to
international drug trafficking and money laundering in aid of
terrorism-without having to take into account the property owner's role
in the offense. Many state forfeiture provisions, like the anti-prostitution
ordinance at issue in Bennis, did in fact authorize asset forfeiture without
providing an "innocent owner defense."3 On the other hand, the federal
forfeiture statutes-or at least those enacted since the late 1970s-have
generally contained innocent owner protections, even though theywere not
constitutipnally required.
For that reason, Bennis did not have a great impact on asset forfeiture
under federal law. The decision did, however, spur debate on the adequacy
of the federal innocent owner defenses,4 and it served to highlight what
forfeiture practitioners had long known: that the federal innocent owner
provisions were ambiguous in their language and scope, and inconsistent
in their application to different crimes. The protection afforded property
owners in drug cases, for example, was different from the protection
afforded in money laundering, or alien smuggling, or child pornography
cases. In addition, the language of the various statutes was so ambiguous
that different courts afforded different protections to property owners in
similar factual situations in cases brought under the same forfeiture statute.
Moreover, Bennis served as a reminder that some of the older federal civil
forfeiture statutes contained no innocent owner protection at all.
In 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice proposed a uniform innocent
owner defense that would apply to virtually all civil forfeiture actions
undertaken under federal law. After much debate and amendment, that
proposal was enacted into law as part of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act of 2000 (CAFRA),5 which took effect on August 23, 2000. The
defense, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(d),6 applies only to federal forfeiture
cases, but it is likely to serve as a model for state forfeiture statutes as well.
This Article discusses the problems that troubled the courts in
connection with the innocent owner defenses under pre-CAFRA law, and
3 d. at 444-45 (describing forfeiture provisions at issue).
4 See H.R. REP. No. 105-358, pt. 1, at 30 (1997), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, LEGISLATIVEHISTORY: CIVILASSETFORFEITUREREFORMACT(CAFRA)
OF 2000, at 244 (2000) (noting that, untilBennis, "many observers assumed that the
Constitution mandated an 'innocent owner' defense to a civil forfeiture action").
I Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA) of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185,
114 Stat. 202 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 19, 21, 31, 42
U.S.C.).
6 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d) (West Supp. 2000).
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how the sponsors of the uniform defense thought that those problems might
be resolved. It then discusses the terms of the new statute and how they are
likely to be interpreted in light of the legislative history and the pre-
CAFRA case law.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE OLD LAW
A. Historical Background
The first federal forfeiture statutes were enacted in the late eighteenth
century, and new statutes were enacted periodically for the next 200 years;
but until the late 1970s none of these statutes contained any exception for
property belonging to innocent owners.7 There were several reasons for
this. One was that the early statutes provided primarily for the forfeiture of
contraband or other property that it was illegal to possess. In such cases,
there is no need for an innocent owner defense, because the government has
an obvious interest in "removing the items from private circulation,
however blameless or unknowing their owners may be."'
The early statutes were also directed at ships that engaged in piracy on
the high seas, in the slave trade, or in smuggling goods into the United
States." In such cases, it was considered appropriate to presume, under
ancient maritime law, that the owner of the ship was aware (or should have
been aware) of the way in which his property was being used. Thus, in a
series of nineteenth century cases, the Supreme Court adopted the principle
that property, such as a ship, could be confiscated without regard to the
owner's participation in, or knowledge of, the illegal act that the ship had
been used to commit.'"
It is one thing to apply a principle of strict liability to pirates, slave
traders, and smugglers, and quite another to apply it to the owners of less
exotic property used to commit more mundane offenses. Nevertheless, in
the twentieth century, during the Prohibition Era, Congress enacted
I The historical background of the innocent owner defense, and the need for
federal legislation to create a uniform statute, were discussed in detail at a
symposium on civil forfeiture reform at Notre Dame Law School in 1995. See
Stefan D. Cassella, Forfeiture Reform: A View From the Justice Department, 21
NOTRE DAME J. LEGIS. 212-28 (1995).
8 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 459 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
Cassella, supra note 7, at 213.
9 Bennis, 516 U.S. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'Old. at 461 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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forfeiture statutes authorizing the confiscation of equipment and vehicles
used for the manufacture and transportation of alcoholic bever-
ages-including vehicles that belonged to an innocent owner and, in all
likelihood, were used in most instances for a legitimate purpose. In other
words, the government could confiscate a car filled with bottles of
moonshine, even if the bootlegger driving the car was not the owner, and
the owner knew nothing about the illegal use of his car on this particular
occasion. Based on the earlier precedents, the Supreme Court upheld the
forfeiture of the vehicles in such cases on the ground that the use of the
property was so undesirable that an owner allowed his property to be used
by another at his own peril."
What had evolved was the notion that the forfeiture laws could be used
not only for a remedial purpose--to take contraband or property used to
commit illegal acts out of circulation-but also for deterrence-to
encourage property owners to be vigilant in how they allowed their
property to be used. In essence, the Court held that property owners will
take greater care, when they allow their property to be used by another, if
they know that they risk the loss of the property, through forfeiture, if the
third party uses the property to commit a crime. It was precisely that
principle that the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Bennis, when it held that a
car used by Mr. Bennis to pick up a prostitute could be forfeited even
though the car belonged to Mrs. Bennis--an innocent owner who, all
parties agreed, did not consent to this particular use of her property. 2
Using the forfeiture laws to encourage property owners to take greater
care in how they allow their property to be used by others has considerable
appeal as a matter of public policy. But as the Bennis case illustrates, it can
have harsh results. Indeed, even the Supreme Court has considered,
however fleetingly, that there might be a constitutional limit on the use of
forfeiture as a means to encourage greater vigilance on the part of property
owners. In 1974, in dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 3 Justice Brennan noted that "it would be
difficult to reject the constitutional claim of... an owner who proved not
only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but
also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property.' 'l4
" Id. at 447-48 (discussing the facts and the holding in Van Oster v. Kansas,
272 U.S. 465 (1926)).
12 Id. at 452.
13 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
14 Id. at 689.
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The dicta in Calero-Toledo never became part of constitutional
doctrine, 5 but by the late 1970s, when the first modem forfeiture statutes
for drug offenses were enacted, the sentiment expressed by Justice Brennan
began to find its way into federal law. More than anything else, the reason
for this was that the scope of the forfeiture statutes had changed. Laws that
were previously directed at slave traders and bootleggers were being
applied in the 1970s to property-like cars, homes, businesses, and bank
accounts-that most citizens own, and that are used in most instances for
legitimate purposes. In those circumstances, the public policy
considerations that favor putting the burden on property owners to
supervise the way their property is used by others had to give way, to some
extent, to the desire to protect the interests of the truly innocent owner who
had no reason to suspect that his home or his car was being used by
someone else to commit a crime. 6
It was this desire to protect the truly innocent that caused Congress,
beginning in 1978, generally to include some degree of protection for
innocent owners whenever it enacted a new forfeiture statute.
B. Inconsistencies andAmbiguities in the Statutory Defenses
It is one thing to accept the notion that the rights of innocent owners
should be protected in some circumstances, and another to find the
language that strikes the proper balance. Too much protection for property
owners undermines the historically recognized public policy goal of
preventing property owners from allowing their property to be used by
others to commit a criminal offense. Too little protection results in property
owners bearing the weight of the national campaign against crime in
circumstances where they are truly powerless to prevent the illegal act.
Unfortunately, Congress's first attempts at drafting innocent owner statutes
produced ambiguity, inconsistency, and loopholes that frustrated the
enforcement of the forfeiture laws.17
1. Inconsistent Language
First, the innocent owner provisions in the most commonly used civil
forfeiture statutes-the ones pertaining to drug and money laundering
15 SeeBennis, 516 U.S. at 449-50 (describing the quoted passage from Calero-
Toledo as dicta, and refusing to follow it).
16 See Cassella, supra note 7, at 213.
'7 Id. at 213-19 (listing problems caused by the drafting of the innocent owner
statutes and related case law).
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offenses--were inconsistent with each other. For example, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4),"8 authorizing the forfeiture of vehicles, vessels and aircraft
used to transport drugs, protected an owner whose property was used
withouthis "knowledge, consent or willful blindness."' 9 Sections 881 (a)(6)
(drug proceeds)2' and 881(aX7) (real property facilitating drug offenses),2"
on the other hand, contained no reference to willful blindness: they
protected those who demonstrated lack of "knowledge or consent."
Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2). (property involved in money laundering),'
required only a showing of lack of "knowledge." 4 These inconsistent
provisions resulted in the development of different innocent owner
standards depending on which forfeiture statute the government happened
to employ.
Moreover, the statutory defenses for drug and money laundering cases
were inconsistent with other innocent owner protections elsewhere in the
U.S. Code. Whereas, for example, the defenses in drug and money
laundering cases applied to all categories of "owners," the innocent owner
provision applicable to alien, smuggling in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)r applied
only to common carriers (airlines, bus companies, etc.),26 and owners
deprived of property in violation of the law.27 Thus, a person whose car was
stolen from him and used to smuggle illegal aliens was considered an
innocent owner, but a person who loaned his car to his brother, not
knowing that the brother was going to use it for such an unlawful purpose,
was not.
Of course, the greatest inconsistency was that most of the recently-
enacted civil forfeiture provisions had at least some form of innocent owner
defense, but the older statutes-such as the gambling forfeiture provision
Is 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1994).
19 Id. § 881(a)(4)(C).21Id. § 881(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1999).
21 Id. § 881(a)(7).
22 Id. § 881(a)(6)-(7).
23 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (1994).
241 d. For a general discussion of the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the pre-
CAFRA innocent owner statutes, see Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing
on H.R. 1916 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 222-26
(1996) [hereinafter 1996Hearings] (testimony ofStefanD. CassellaDeputy Chief,
Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the Department of Justice),
reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 114-16.
2 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b) (1994).
2 Id. § 1324(b)(1)(A).27 Id. § 1324(b)(1)(B).
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in 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d),2" orthe smuggling provision in 18 U.S.C. § 54529--
contained no protection for innocent owners at all. In light of Bennis v.
Michigan," courts were required to hold that claimants in cases brought
under the older statutes had no right to assert an innocent owner defense.31
2. Disjunctive or Conjunctive?
There was also a healthy measure of inconsistency introduced by the
case law. As previously discussed, the innocent owner defense under some
of the drug forfeiture statutes required the owner to establish that the illegal
use of his property took place "without the knowledge or consent" of the
owner. 2 But were the terms "knowledge" and "consent" intended to be
disjunctive or conjunctive requirements?
The Ninth Circuit interpreted "knowledge or consent" to mean that a
person had to prove that she did not have knowledge of the criminal offense
and did not consent to the use of the property to commit that offense.3
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, a wife who knew that her husband was using her
property to commit a criminal offense could not defeat the forfeiture of that
property by showing that she did not consent to the illegal use, or that she
tried to stop it. Her failure to establish lack of knowledge, by itself, was
fatal to her innocent owner claim. Similarly, a claimant in the Ninth Circuit
28 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1994).29 Id. § 545.
30 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996). For a discussion of the holding in
this case, see supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
31 SeeUnited States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999)
(applying Bennis and holding that there is no innocent owner defense for violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 545); United States v. Various Ukranian Artifacts, No. CV-96-3285,
1997 WL 793093 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1997) (holding that there is no innocent
owner defense for violations of 19 U.S.C. § 1497); United States v. $83,132.00 in
U.S. Currency, No. 95-CV-2844, 1996 WL 599725 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1996)
(applying Bennis and holding that there is no innocent owner defense in forfeiture
cases involving unreported currency brought under 31 U.S.C. § 5317).
32 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)-(7) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
33 See United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990)
(interpreting "knowledge" and "consent' as conjunctive terms, and holding that a
claimant must prove lack of both). See generally Anthony 3. Franze, Note,
Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture, and the Plight of the "Innocent
Owner," 70NoTRE DAME L. REv. 369 (1994). The Eighth Circuit apparently also
followed the conjunctive approach. See United States v. One 1989 Jeep Wagoneer,
976 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a claimant who could show lack of
knowledge and lack of consent still had to show he was not willfully blind).
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who did not know that her property was being used illegally nevertheless
had to show that she did not consent in advance to the illegal use.34 Failure
to show lack of consent was fatal to the claim. 5
But the Second and Third Circuits, interpreting the statute
disjunctively, held that a person could establish an innocent owner defense
by showing either lack of knowledge or lack of consent. Thus, a person
who had knowledge that her property was being used for an illegal purpose
could avoid forfeiture by showing that she did not consent to that use of the
property.36 In addition, a person who did not know that the property was'
being used illegally was automatically deemed an innocent owner on the
ground that a person could not consent to what she did not know.37
3 See United States v. Property Titled in the Names of Ponce, 751 F. Supp.
1436, 1440 n.3 (D. Haw. 1990) (disagreeing with the Second Circuit and stating
that the claimant must show that she did not consent in advance to the illegal use
of her property, even if she proves that she did not actually know whether such use
ever occurred).
35 District Courts in the Eleventh Circuit must apply the conjunctive test
because when there is an intra-circuit split on an issue, the earlier decision controls.
See United States v. 7079 Chilton County Rd. 37, 123 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608-09
(M.D. Ala. 2000) (requiring that a claimant must show lack of knowledge and that
all reasonable steps were taken to prevent illegal use of property). Compare United
States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1500 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding
that aclaimant may show lack ofknowledge or lack of consent), with United States
v. 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d 976,981 (1Ith Cir. 1991) (holding that a claimant
must prove both that he had no knowledge of the illegal act and that he did not
consent to the illegal activities). In this situation, however, the earlier appellate
decision controls. See 7079 CountyRd. 37, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 608-09 (adoptingthe
conjunctive interpretation in 15603 85th Ave. N.).
I See United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 816-17 (3d Cir.
1994) (surveying cases from the different circuits and following 6109 Grubb Rd.);
United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
a landlord who knew building was being used for drug trafficking was entitled to
an opportunity to show he did not consent to such use); United States v. 6109
Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618,626 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a wife who knew of her
husband's use of their residence for drug trafficking was entitled to show she did
not consent to such use). The Eleventh Circuit issued seemingly contradictory
opinions on this point. See supra note 35. The Fifth Circuit reserved judgment on
this issue. See United States v. Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d 994,
1000 (5th Cir. 1990).
37 See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878. The Seventh Circuit also recognized an
innocent owner defense where there was a lack of actual knowledge. See United
States v. 7426 Highway 45 N., 965 F.2d 311,315 (7th Cir. 1992).
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A difference in the statutory language for money laundering and bank
fraud cases resulted in an entirely different rule. As mentioned previously,
the forfeiture provision forthose offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a)(2)"8 lacked
a "consent" requirement: the claimant was required only to establish that
the criminal offense was committed without her knowledge. This made it
easier for a claimant to establish an innocent owner defense in the
"conjunctive" circuits, because a claimant who established a lack of
knowledge had no additional burden of showing lack of consent.39 In the
"disjunctive" circuits, however, a claimant who knew her property was
involved in a money laundering or bank fraud offense was out of luck: there
was no opportunity under § 981(a)(2) to show that the claimant
nevertheless did not consent to the illegal activity.
3. Property Acquired After the Offense
The most serious difficulties with the pre-CAFRA innocent owner
provisions resulted from the failure to distinguish between property
interests that existed at the time of the criminal offense (i.e., interests that
existed before the property became subject to forfeiture), and interests that
were not acquired until after the crime was committed (i.e., interests that
did not exist until the property was already subject to forfeiture). All of the
legislative history and early case law suggest that the innocent owner
statutes were drafted with only pre-existing ownership interests in mind.4 '
The typical scenario involved a spouse or third party who had an interest
in a car or house that was being used to facilitate a criminal offense such
3S 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (1994).
39See United States v. 874 Gartel Drive, 79 F.3d 918, 923-24 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the language in § 981(a)(2) does not require a claimant to take
reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use of his or her property under the "consent"
prong of the innocent owner defense); United States v. $1,646,000 in Cashiers
Checks and Currency, 118 F. Supp. 2d 977 (N.D. Cal.) (following the reasoning
in 874 GartelDrive), withdrawn, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (NJD. Cal. 2000); United
States v. $705,270.00 in U.S. Currency, 820 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (S.D. Fla. 1993);
see also United States v. Various Computers, 82 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
that proof of having taken all reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use of the
property not required unless the statutory innocent owner defense contains a
"consent" prong).
40 See United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 836 F. Supp. 1147,1160 n.16 (E.D.Pa.
1993) (holding that lack of consent is not available as a defense under § 981(a)(2)).
4, See One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 794.
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as drug trafficking. Little or no attention was paid to issues that might arise
if the wrongdoer transferred property he had used to commit a criminal
offense to a third party after the crime had been committed.
It is likely that everyone assumed, when the innocent owner statutes
were drafted, that the relation-back doctrine, codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(h), would void any post-illegal act transfer of forfeitable property,
making any innocent owner defense in such cases unnecessary. 3 Section
881(h) provides that "[a]ll right, title, and interest" in property subject to
forfeiture vests in the United States "upon commission of the act giving rise
to [the] forfeiture." This meant that at the moment a property owner used,
or allowed his property to be used, to commit a crime, the property owner
was divested of his interest in the property, with title passing to the U.S.
Government.
When property is transferred from one person to another, the receiver
can obtain no better title than the transferor has to give. So if the owner of
property subject to forfeiture had already been divested of his title upon the
commission of the illegal act, he had no title that could be passed on to a
third party, and the third party had no interest that could be asserted in the
forfeiture proceeding. Thus, it was the prevailing view that the post-illegal
act receiver of forfeitable property lacked standing to assert an innocent
owner defense when the property was forfeited. 45
All of that changed with the Supreme Court's decision in UnitedStates
v. 92 Buena VistaAve./ In that case, a drug dealer made a gift of $240,000
in drug proceeds to his girlfriend, who used the money to buy the defendant
real property. The government, invoking the relation-back theory, argued
that the drug dealer lacked title to the illicitly-derived funds, and thus had
no title he could pass on to his girlfriend. For that reason, according to the
government, the girlfriend, who was the claimant in the forfeiture case, had
42 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1994).
43 See One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 817 (discussingthe general assumption
that the "relation back" provision prevented a post-illegal act transferee from
asserting an innocent owner defense).
44 21 U.S.C. § 881(h).41 SeeUnited States v. One 1985 Nissan, 300ZX, 889 F.2d 1317, 1320 (4th Cir.
1989) (holding that no one can acquire title to property after the illegal act takes
place because the wrongdoer lacks good title to pass on to a third party and that,
"unless a claimant has a claim to the property forfeited which existed prior to the
time the acts take place which bring on forfeiture, then the innocent owner
provision of the statute [§ 881(a)(6)] has no application.").46United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111 (1993).
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no interest in the defendant property and could not assert an innocent owner
defense under the applicable statute.47
The Supreme Court, however, heldthat the relation back doctrine is not
self-executing and thus does not divest a wrongdoer of title to his or her
property until a court enters a judgment of forfeiture to that effect.4 For
that reason, the government could not use the relation-back doctrine to
prevent property owners with an after-acquired interest in property from
contesting the forfeiture. Such persons were "owners" within the meaning
of the statute, and could file claims and assert an innocent owner defense.
Moreover, the Court held that because the civil forfeiture statutes did
not limit the innocent owner defense to persons who purchase the property
in good faith, the defense could be asserted by an innocent donee.49 Justice
Kennedy, in a dissenting opinion, noted that this allowed drug dealers to
shield their property from forfeiture through transfers to relatives or other
innocent persons. The ruling, Justice Kennedy said, "rips out the most
effective enforcement provisions in all of the drug forfeiture laws," 0 and
"leaves the forfeiture scheme that is the centerpiece of the Nation's drug
enforcement laws in quite a mess." ' Justice Stevens, however, writing for
the plurality, said that the Court was bound by the statutory language
enacted by Congress. "That a statutory provision contains 'puzzling'
language, or seems unwise," he wrote, "is not an appropriate reason for
simply ignoring its text." 2
The holding in 92 Buena Vista produced a number of troubling results.
For one thing, as Justice Kennedy predicted, it became routine for drug
dealers and other criminals to pass on their forfeitable property to family
members, girlfriends and other innocent third parties, knowing that the
government could not use the civil forfeiture statutes to recover it.53 In
4 Id. at 123-24. The 92 Buena Vista case is discussed in detail in Franze, supra
note 33, at 361.
48 92 Buena Vista, 507 U.S. at 125. See United States v. Spahi, 177 F.3d 748,
754 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that, because the relation back doctrine is not self-
executing, title to property sought to be forfeited does not vest automatically in the
government upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture but must be
acquired by the government through legal action).
49 92 Buena Vista, 507 U.S. at 123.
5oId. at 145 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
5
,Id. at 144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
52Id. at 126 n.20.53 SeeUnited States v. 221 DanaAve., 81 F. Supp. 2d 182,188 (D. Mass. 2000)
(holding that an innocent heir who acquired interest upon death of drug dealer
prevailed under 92 Buena Vista and explaining that pre-92 Buena Vista cases
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response, the government made it a standard part of its forfeiture training
to instruct federal prosecutors that in cases where a defendant had
transferred forfeitable property to an innocent third party, such as a minor
child, the government had to rely on the criminal forfeiture statutes (which
do contain a bona fide purchaser requirement) to void the transfer and
confiscate the property.'
Even more troubling, from the government's perspective, was an issue
left unresolved in 92 Buena Vista: whether a claimant's state of mind-for
purposes of the innocent owner defense-should be determined at the time
the crime was committed or at the time the claimant acquired his interest
in the forfeitable property.' Predictably, the courts split on this issue.
The Eleventh Circuit held that, for purposes of the innocent owner
defense, the claimant's state of mind had to be determined as of the time
the person acquired his interest in the forfeitable property. A person who
acquires property knowing that it was used to commit an illegal act, the
court held, is not an innocent owner.5 . Thus, in that circuit, even though a
holding to the contrary are probably no longer good law), vacated by 239 F.3d 78
(lst Cir. 2001); cf In re Seizure of $82,000, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (W.D. Mo.
2000) (holding that the claimant acquired an interest in abandoned property by
operation of law and became an owner before the government's interest vested
under the relation-back doctrine).
I In criminal forfeiture cases, the relation-back doctrine is codified at2l U.S.C.
§ 853(c) (1994), which provides that "[a]ll right, title and interest in property"
subject to forfeiture "vests in the United States upon the commission of the act
giving rise to the forfeiture," and subsequent transfers to third parties are therefore
void "unless the transferee establishes... that he is a bona fide purchaser for
value." Id. It is this provision that allows courts to void a post-illegal act transfer
of forfeitable property in a criminal case where the transferee, like the claimant in
92 Buena Vista, is a mere donee; as well, it was the absence of such aprovision that
allowed innocent donees to defeat forfeiture actions in civil cases. See United
Stites v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the 92 Buena
Vista decision does not apply to criminal forfeiture cases and that it does not apply
to civil cases under CAFRA); United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A.
(Petition of American Express Bank II), 961 F. Supp. 287, 30-32 (D.D.C. 1997)
(explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1)(6)(A)-(B) (1994) embody the relation-back
doctrine, and because there is no ambiguity in these provisions (as there was in the
civil forfeiture statutes at issue in 92 Buena Vista) regarding the interplay of the
doctrine with third party defenses, 92 Buena Vista does not expand the claimant's
right to recover on grounds outside ofwhat subparagraphs (A) and (B) authorize).
ss92 Buena Vista, 507 U.S. at 129-30.
56 See United States v. 6640 SW 48th St., 41 F.3d 1448 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a lawyer who acquired an interest in forfeitable property as his fee
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person with an after-acquired interest in the property could contest a
forfeiture under 92 Buena Vista, the claimant still had to establish his
innocence by showing that he did not know the property was subject to
forfeiture at the time he acquired it. The majority of courts followed this
rule." But in the Third Circuit, the rule was the opposite. In United States
v. One 1973 Rolls Royce,5" the court held that the claimant's state of mind
had to be evaluated as of the time the property became subject to
forfeiture-i.e., when the criminal act took place. In the case of after-
acquired property, this meant that the claimant was automatically entitled
to be considered an innocent owner, because he could not have consented
to the illegal use of the property before he owned it 9
The holding in One 1973 Rolls Royce rendered the civil forfeiture
statutes useless in the Third Circuit in cases involving after-acluired
interests in property.' But the panel clearly stated that if its decision left
was not an innocent owner).57 See United States v. 352 Northup St., 40 F. Supp. 2d 74, 82 (D.R.I. 1999)
(holding that a father who received money he knew to be proceeds of his son's
drug trafficking, and used it to buy land, was not an innocent owner of the land);
United States v. Funds in the Amount of $228,390, No. 94 C 6618, 1996 WL
284943, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1996) ("[l]f a post-illegal act transferee knows of
illegal activity which would subject property to forfeiture at the time he takes his
interest, he cannot assert the innocent owner defense."); United States v. 3 Parcels
in La Plata County, 919 F. Supp. 1449, 1457 (D. Nev. 1995) (holding that claimant
must show that he holds an ownership interest and was ignorant of the illegal
conduct giving rise to the forfeiture action at the time he acquired his ownership
interest); see also United States v. 10936 Oak Run Circle, 9 F.3d 74, 76 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that the statute bars an owner with knowledge of the origin of the
property as coming from drug proceeds from asserting the innocent owner defense
and noting that such person has a duty to inquire at the time of the transfer).
58 United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794 (3d Cir. 1994).59 Id. at 817 ("[A] post-illegal-act transferee who did not know of the illegal act
at the time it occurred will always be able to make out the innocent owner defense,
regardless of whether he or she knew about the taint at the time of the transfer.");
see also United States v. 221 Dana Ave., 239 F.3d 78, 83-90 (1st Cir. 2001)
(declining to choose between the Eleventh Circuit and Third Circuit rules as the
applicable rule in all circumstances, but applying the Third Circuit rule where a
wife had a pre-existing partial interest in her personal residence, was "innocenf' of
her husband's criminal activity, and acquired her interest in the remainder of the
property by virtue of her husband's suicide).
60 See, e.g., United States v. 1993 Bentley Coupe, 986 F. Supp. 893 (D.N.J.
1997) (applying One 1973 Rolls Royce and holding that claimant who bought
property in a tax sale after being notified it was subject to pending federal forfeiture
action was nevertheless an innocent owner).
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the innocent owner statute in a mess, "the problem originated in Congress
when it failed to draft a statute that takes into account the substantial
differences between those owners who own the property during the
improper use and some of those who acquire it afterwards."' The court
concluded, "Congress should redraft the statute, if it desires a different
result." 2
C. The Justice Department's Proposal
In 1996, the Department of Justice submitted to Congress a proposed
revision of the innocent owner statutes that addressed all of these
concerns.
63
First, the proposal replaced the various inconsistent innocent owner
provisions with a uniform defense that would apply to most federal civil
forfeiture statutes. Thus, there would no longer be different defenses when
forfeiture was sought in connection with different crimes, and there would
no longer be a total lack of a defense for the older forfeiture provisions
enacted before the late 1970s."
Second, using the criminal forfeiture statute as a model,65 the proposal
created separate defenses for property interests that existed at the time of
the illegal act and interests that were acquired afterward. In the first
category, the proposal adopted the "disjunctive" rule so that property
owners would be able to defeat forfeiture by showing that either 1) that
they lacked knowledge of the offense, or 2) upon learning of the illegal use
61 One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 820.
62 1d.
63 The text of the 1996 proposal appears in 1996 Hearings, supra note 24, at
137-41, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 71-73. For a legal
analysis, see id. at 61-66, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 33-
36. See also 1996 Hearings, supra note 24, at 225-27 (testimony of Stefan D.
Cassella), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 115-16. For a full
discussion of the legislative history of CAFRA, see Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of2000, 27 NOTRE DAME J. LEGIS. 89 (2001).
I See 1996Hearings, supra note 24, at 215 (testimony of Stefan D. Cassella),
reprinted in U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, supra note 4, at 110 ("The Supreme Court held
this Term that the Constitution does not prohibit the government from forfeiting
property of an innocent person. Maybe so, but Congress by statute can provide
more protection than the Constitution requires, and we think it should.!).
65 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)-(B) (1994). The criminal forfeiture statute
served as a model for the new uniform innocent owner defense in the sense that it
created separate defenses forpersons who had apre-existing interest in the property
when it became subject to forfeiture and persons with an after-acquired interest.
Also, as discussed infra Part HI.C, the provision relating to after-acquired interests
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of the property, they "did all that reasonably could be expected to terminate
such use of the property."" This was intended to allow a spouse or other
third party to challenge the forfeiture of her property, even if she knew that
it was being used illegally, by showing that she did everything that a
reasonable person in her circumstances would have done to prevent the
illegal use.67 The "all that reasonably could be expected" test was derived
from the dicta in Calero-Toledo8 and was consistent with the way the
courts had defined the term "consent" under the existing statutes.69 The
is modeled closely after § 853(n)(6)(B). But note that the defense for pre-existing
interests in civil cases is quite different from the corresponding defense in criminal
cases. In civil cases, the claimant has to be "innocent," whereas in criminal cases
the claimant need only show that she had a "superior" interest in the property. Id
§ 853(n)(6)(A). In other words, a non-innocent third party can prevail under §
853(n)(6)(A) in a criminal case, because criminal forfeitures are limited to the
interests ofthe defendant. See United States v. Lester, 85 F.3d 1409 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting, in dicta, that defendant could have challenged forfeiture on the grounds
that property was held by a corporation, not by the defendant, and that unless the
corporate form couldbe ignored, defendant's only forfeitable interest was his stock
in the corporation); United States v. Riley, 78 F.3d 367 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
that if the corporation used by defendant to commit the offense is not a defendant,
only defendant's interest in the corporation may be forfeited, not the corporation
itself or its assets); United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. (Petition
of Chawla), 46 F.3d 1185, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that "only the property
of the defendant (including property held by a third party pursuant to a voidable
transaction) can be confiscated in a RICO proceeding"); United States v. Jimerson,
5 F.3d 1453 (1 th Cir. 1993) (holding that the government may not use an ancillary
proceeding in a criminal forfeiture case to forfeit the interests of third parties). But
a non-innocent third-party cannot prevail in a civil case. This is the reason the
government must resort to civil forfeiture when the defendant uses property
belonging to a third party (with the third party's knowledge) to commit a crime.
"1996 Hearings, supra note 24, at 138, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 72.
6 1996 Hearings, supra note 24, at 225 (testimony of Stefan D. Cassella),
reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 115.
"Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). For a
discussion of the dicta in this case, see supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.9 Thus, as the majority of courts now hold, under the second defense a
spouse could defeat forfeiture of her property, even if she knew that it was
being used illegally, by showing that she did everything that a reasonable
person in her circumstances would have done to prevent the illegal use.
1996 Hearings, supra note 24, at 65, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra
note 4, at 35. For an analysis of the 1999 Department of Justice Proposal, see
Oversight ofFederalAssetForfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing on H.R.
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Department's proposal also assumed that "knowledge," under the first
prong of the test, would include "willful blindness," as many courts had
decided under the old law.70
For the second category of cases-those involving property acquired
after the offense giving rise to the forfeiture-the Department proposed
language modeled on 21 U.S.C. § 853(nX6)(B),7 ' the statute governing
after-acquired third-party interests in criminal forfeiture cases. Under the
proposal, a person would be considered an innocent owner if she
established that she acquired the property as a bona fide purchaser for value
who at the time of the purchase did not know and was reasonably without
cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.' In hearings to
consider the proposal in 1996, the Department's witness noted that this
provision would be of particular importance in cases involving the
acquisition of drug dollars on the black market in South America. In such
cases, wealthy persons assist in the laundering of drug money by
purchasing U.S. dollars, or dollar-denominated instruments, while
maintaining ignorance of their source." The new statute, the Department
suggested, would put the burden on such individuals to show that they took
all reasonable steps to ensure that they were not acquiring drug proceeds.74
The Department's proposal addressed two other recurring issues: the
definition of "owner," and the authority of the court to sever the defendant
property in the event that the property was owned, in part, by an innocent
1658 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999), 1999 WL 20010421 [hereinafter 1999 Hearings],
reprintedin U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, supra note 4, at 366-78. See also cases at infra
note 146 and accompanying text.
70 1996 Hearings, supra note 24, at 65, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 35 ("[A] showing of a lack of knowledge would be a complete
defense to forfeiture. But to show lack of knowledge, the owner would have to
show that he was not willfully blind to the illegal use of the property.'); see 1996
Hearings, supra note 24, at 225 (testimony of Stefan D. Cassella), reprintedin U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 115; 1999 Hearings, supra note 69, reprinted
in U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 368. See also cases at infra note 137 and
accompanying text.
7 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (1994).
1 996Hearings, supra note 24, at 138-39, reprinted in U.S.DEP'TOF JUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 72.
7 See United States v. Cuartas, No. 99-0675-CR-MIDDLEBROOKS (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 27,2001) (report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge).
41996Hearings,supra note 24, at 138-39, reprinted in U.S.DEP'TOFJUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 72.
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owner. The proposal defined "owner" to include lienholders and others
with secured interests in the subject property, but to exclude general
creditors, bailees and nominees. It authorized the district court to take any
of three alternative actions to dispose of property jointly owned by a guilty
person and an innocent owner: 1) sever the property; 2) liquidate the
property and order the return of a portion of the proceeds to the innocent
party; or 3) allow the innocent party to remain in possession of the
property, subject to a lien in favor of the government to the extent of the
guilty party's interest."
HM. REQUMEMENTS OF § 983(d)
A. Uniform Affirmative Defense
The innocent owner defense ultimately enacted by Congress as part of
CAFRA is essentially the Justice Department's 1996 proposal with a few
additions and amendments. The remainder of this Article discusses the
elements of the defense as it is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(d).7 6
Section 983(dXl) sets out the basic principle that "[ain innocent
owner's interest in property shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture
statute."7 Thus, all federal civil forfeiture statutes are now subject to an
innocent owner defense, and the defense is the same regardless of the
statute under which the forfeiture action is brought. The only exception
concerns the forfeiture statutes that are specifically exempted from the
definition of "civil forfeiture statute" by § 983(i). 8 For forfeitures under
those statutes, there is still no innocent owner defense.
75 Id. at 140, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 73.
76 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d) (West Supp. 2000).
"Id. § 983(d)(1).
78 Section 983(i) provides:
In this section, the term "civil forfeiture statute"--
(1) means any provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of
property other than as a sentence imposed upon conviction ofa criminal
offense; and
(2) does not include-
(A) the Tariff Act of 1930 or any other provision of law codified in
title 19;
(B) the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
(C) the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 etseq.);
(D) the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.); or
(E) section 1 of title VI of the Act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 233; 22
U.S.C. 401).
Id. § 983(i).
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A conforming amendment in § 2(c) of CAFRA repeals the pre-existing
innocent owner provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 98 1(a)(2),21 U.S.C. § 88 1(a)(4),
(6), (7), 18 U.S.C. § 2254(a), and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b).' It is evident from
the legislative history that Congress expressly intended that CAFRA
override any inconsistent provisions found in the "old law," except where
the specific exemption in § 983(i) applied.' Thus, if Congress
inadvertently failed to repeal the innocent owner provision in any federal
forfeiture statute when it drafted CAFRA, forfeitures under that statute will
nevertheless be governed by § 983(d).
Section 983(dXl) goes on to provide that "[t]he claimant shall have the
burden of proving that the claimant is an innocent owner by a
preponderance of the evidence."'" This provision was included in the bill
to make clear that "innocent ownership" remains an affirmative defense, as
it was under all of the previously enacted statutes, 2 notwithstanding
CAFRA's shifting of the burden to the government in proving the nexus
between the property and the underlying offense as part of its case-in-
chief8 3
B. Pre-existing Owners
Section 983(d) adopts the Justice Department's proposed division of
the innocent owner defense into two parts, so that pre-existing ownership
79Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA) of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185,
§ 2(c), 114 Stat. 202.8
°SeeH.R REP.No. 106-192, at21 (1999), reprinted in U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 283 ('To the extent these procedures are inconsistent with any
preexisting federal law, these procedures apply and supercede preexisting law.").
8118 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(1).
82See, e.g., United States v. 194 Quaker Farms Rd., 85 F.3d 985, 990 (2d Cir.
1996) (shifting of the burden of proof to the party who has superior access to
evidence is not unconstitutional); United States v. Land, Prop. Recorded in Name
of Neff, 960 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that once the government
establishes probable cause, the burden shifts to claimant to establish affirmative
defense by preponderance of the evidence).83 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(c). The House version of CAFRA was unclear as to
whether, under the new law, the claimant would retain the burden of proof as to the
affirmative defense. During the House debate in 1999, several members of
Congress erroneously assumed that because the bill shifted the burden of proof to
the government regarding the forfeitability ofthe property, it also intended to place
the burden on the government to disprove the innocent owner defense. U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 292. The explicit statement regarding the burden of
proof in § 983(d)(1) was necessary to negate any contrary inference that might
otherwise have been drawn from the legislative history.
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interests and after-acquired interests are treated differently. Pre-existing
interests are governed by § 983(dX2), and after-acquired interests are
governed by § 983(d)(3).
Regarding pre-existing interests, § 983(dX2XA) provides:
with respect to a property interest in existence at the time the illegal
conduct giving rise to forfeiture took place, the term "innocent owner"
means an owner who-
(i) did not know of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture; or
(ii) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, did all
that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to
terminate such use of the property."
1. Distinguishing "Ownership" and "Standing"
The threshold requirement of this statute is that the claimant must
establish, as part of his affirmative defense, that he is an "owner" of the
defendant property. If the claimant cannot establish that he has the required
ownership interest, his innocence is irrelevant.87
The requirement that the claimant establish an ownership interest in the
defendant property is part of her affirmative defense, and is separate and
distinct from her duty to establish that she has standing to contest the
forfeiture. In every civil forfeiture case, of course, the claimant must
establish that she has standing to litigate her claim." But to establish
standing, a claimant need only show that she has a "facially colorable
interest in the proceedings sufficient to satisfy the case-or-controversy
84 18 U.S.CA. § 983(d)(2).85 Id. §983(d)(3).
86 Id. § 983(d)(2)(A).
s7 SeeIn re Seizure of $82,000, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 (W.D. Mo. 2000)
(conceding that claimants were innocent, but still requiring that they prove that
they are owners under state law); United States v. 1512 Lark Drive, 978 F. Supp.
935, 940 (D.S.D. 1997), affid, 187 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding as a matter
of state law that, if the wife is not an owner or a lienholder of the property, her
knowledge of the illegal activity is irrelevant); United States v. All Funds in "The
Anaya Trust" Account, No. C-95-0778 DLJ, 1997 WL 578662, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (discussing the two parts of the innocent owner defense: claimant must be
an owner, and must be innocent-as defined by statute).
" See, e.g., United States v. $515,060.42 in U.S. Currency, 152 F.3d 491,497
(6th Cir. 1998); United States v. $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d 238,245 (5th Cir. 1998).
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requirement" under Article Im of the Constitution. 9 A "facially colorable
interest," however, is not the same thing as ownership, and a person may
establish standing without being an owner of the property.o
Indeed, courts have granted standing to persons with amere possessory
interest in the property," or to a person whose name appears on the title to
the property, even though the person is merely a nominee.' One court
89 $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d at 245. See United States v. $81,000.00, 189 F.3d
28, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Courts generally do not deny standing to a claimant who
is either the colorable owner of the res or who has any colorable possessory interest
in it."). United States v. Accounts Nos. 3034504504 and 144-07143, 971 F.2d 974
(3d Cir. 1992).
o See Kadonsky v. United States, 246 F.3d 681 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished
table decision) (holding that for standing, claimant need not prove merits of
underlying claim; allegation of ownership and some supporting evidence, such as
possession, is sufficient; but claimant may yet fail to establish ownership on the
merits); In re Seizure of $82,000, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1017-18 (holding that the
titled owner and purchaser of vehicle both have a colorable interest sufficient for
standing, but must prove ownership as part of innocent owner defense on the
merits).
91 See United States v. 1982 Sanger 24' Spectra Boat, 738 F.2d 1043, 1046
(9th Cir. 1984) ("A lesser property interest such as possession creates standing.').
Simple possession of the property, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish
standing in most courts, but simple possession is sufficient if it is "accompanied by
factual allegations regarding how the claimant came to possess the property, the
nature of the claimant's relationship to the property, and/or the story behind the
claimant's control ofthe property." $515,060.42 in U.S. Currency, 152 F.3dat 498.
See also United States v. $1,646,000 in Cashiers Checks and Currency, 118 F.
Supp. 2d 977, 983 (N.D. Cal.) (holding that possession plus assertion of ownership
is sufficient to establish standing to contest forfeiture of cashiers checks and cash),
withdrawn, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2000); United States v. $271,070.00
in U.S. Currency, No. 96 C 239, 1997 WL 94722, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding
that claimant need not assert an ownership interest when a possessory interest is
sufficient for standing, but explaining that bald assertions of possessory or
ownership interestwithoutevidentiary supportwill notbe sufficient); United States
v. 47 W. 644 Route 38, 962 F. Supp. 1081, 1085-86 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that
simple possession is enough to establish standing, but requiring claimant to be
more than an "unknowing custodian!) (quoting Mercado v. United States Customs
Serv., 873 F.2d 641,645 (2d Cir. 1989)); Olivo v. United States, No. 96 Civ. 2620,
1997 WL 23181, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding that the person's conscious
possession of the property seized was sufficient for standing to contest its
forfeiture, despite lack of ownership).
92 See United States v. 1998 BMW 'T' Convertible, 235 F.3d 397 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that name on title sufficient to establish standing); United States v.
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recently held that a person with no legal interest in real property, but who
would be rendered homeless if the property were forfeited to the
government, had standing to contest the forfeiture.9
Such persons, however, are not "owners" of the property within the
meaning of § 983(dX2)(A). To be an "owner" of the property, the claimant
must show that she has a legal interest in the property in accordance with
state property law,94 and must exercise dominion and control over the
property.95 Thus, it is entirely possible, and not uncommon, for a person to
Ida, 14 F. Supp. 2d 454,460 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that the titled owner of real
property, who used his own money to purchase the property, has standing to file
a claim, even if he is a mere straw person); see also Kadonsky, 246 F.3d at 681
(holding that payee on check has standing to contest forfeiture of check).
93 United States v. 8402 W. 132nd St., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1043 (N.D. Ill.
2000); see also United States v. 5 S. 351 Tuthill Rd., 233 F.3d 1017,1023 (7th Cir.
2000) (as amended Mar. 21,2001) (holding that a filure to exercise dominion and
control does not negate standing if claimant is a beneficiary of a land trust who
would be injured if the property were forfeited). Butsee United States v. Antonelli
(In re 837 Mass. Ave. N.), No. 95-CR-200, 1998 WL 775055, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.
Nov. 2, 1998) (holding that defendant's minor children have no legal interest in
real property held exclusively in the defendant's name, and therefore have no basis
for challenging a criminal forfeiture order, even though the property is their
residence).
I See United States v. 221 DanaAve., 239 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that
wife's interest in marital property determined by State law of dower rights);
$81,000.00, 189 F.3d at 33 ("State law determines ownership interest in the joint
[bank] account."); United States v. 1980 Learlet, 25 F.3d 793,797 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that state law determines existence and extent of lienholder's interest);
United States v. 1512 Lark Drive, 978 F. Supp. 935, 940 (D.S.D. 1997) (holding
that state law determines whether wife has an interest in property held in husband's
name), afd, 187 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. 2930 Greenleaf St.,
920 F. Supp. 639, 645 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (concluding that state law determines if
claimant became owner of real property when she recorded deed after lis pendens
was filed); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 836 F. Supp. 1147, 1160 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (stating that "state law controls the question ofwhether a person is an owner
or no").
95 See $81,000.00, 189 F.3d at 35 (holding that claimant with legal title to joint
bank account must also show he was not a "nominal or straw owner"); United
States v. 500 Delaware St., 113 F.3d 310, 312 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that father
who acquired real property from his son for $1 in admitted attempt to avoid
forfeiture was mere straw owner who exercised no dominion or control over the
property); United States v. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 37 F.3d 421,422 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding that titled owner did not exercise dominion or control); United
States v. 191 Whitney Place, No. 98-CV-0060 E, 2000 WL 1335748, at *3
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have standing to contest a forfeiture yet fail to establish that she has the
requisite ownership interest to prevail at trial.'
This issue has become confused in the case law by the unfortunate
tendency of some courts to use the term "standing" to refer to both the
threshold Article III requirement and the ultimate determination of
ownership on the merits. For example, in UnitedStates v. $9,041,598.68,"
the District Court for the Southern District of Texas found, at the outset of
the case, that a claimant who controlled a family bank account had standing
to contest the forfeiture of the defendant's funds9 After a trial on the
merits, however, the court reversed itselt finding that the claimant had not
established the requisite ownership interest in the property and therefore
did not have standing."
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2000); 2930 Greenleaf St., 920 F. Supp. at 646, 646-47
(concluding that legal title was insufficient to establish ownership when claimant
did not exercise dominion and control); United States v. $228,390, No. 94 C 6618,
1996 WL 284943, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1996) (rejecting standing claim because
corporation was straw owner); United States v. One 1988 Prevost Liberty Motor
Home, 952 F. Supp. 1180, 1203 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (explaining that a court must
look"beyond formal title to determine whether the record owneris the 'real' owner
or merely a 'strawman"' who does not exercise dominion and control).
6 SeeKadonsy, 246 F.3d at 681 (concluding that claimant may have standing
yet fail to establish ownership on the merits); United States v. $9,041,598.68, 163
F.3d 238,245 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining that claimant had standing to contest the
forfeiture, but that ultimately the jury determined, on the merits, that claimant was
not an owner of the property). The same situation occurs in criminal forfeiture
cases. See United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 820 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
that a spouse in a community property state had a colorable interest in the
defendant's property sufficient to establish Article II standing, but did not have the
legal interest necessary to prevail on the merits); United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia,
79 F.3d 769, 774 n.10 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that an allegation of ownership
is sufficient to establish standing under 12 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2), but may not satisfy
"superior interest" requirements of § 853(n)(6)(A)); Ida, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 460;
United States v. BCCIHoldings (Luxembourg), SA. (Petition ofAmericanExpress
Bank I), 961 F. Supp. 287,294-96 (D.D.C. 1997) (granting motion for summary
judgment for failure to establish ownership interest under 18 U.S.C. §
1963(l)(6)(A) or (B), even though claimant had standing).
9 United States v. $9,041,598.68,976F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Tex. 1997), aftd, 163
F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 1998).
95Id. at 648.
9 Id. at 649 (recognizing that control over a "family" bank account may be
sufficient to satisfy threshold standing requirements at the onset of trial, but
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, but noted that
the court's initial determination of standing was correct and should not
have been reconsidered in light of what took place at trial. The district
court's later determination that the claimant had no ownership interest in
the defendant property, the panel said, went to the merits of the affirmative
defense, not to the claimant's standing to litigate his claim."°°
Similarly, in United States v. Hooper,°1 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a
decision by the District Court for the Southern District of California in a
criminal forfeiture case where the court held that the defendants' wives
lacked standing to contest the forfeiture of certain property that they
alleged to be part of their respective marital estates." z The Ninth Circuit
held that there was "no dispute that Claimants had Article I standing to
file their petitions and challenge the forfeitures on their asserted
grounds."' 3 What the district court meant in concluding that the claimants
lacked "standing," the panel said, was "simply another way of stating that
Claimants had failed to establish on the merits a property interest entitling
them to relief."" 4
To avoid such confusion, the better practice would be to refer to the
threshold Article III "case-or-controversy" requirement as one that
necessitates a showing by the claimant that he has standing to litigate his
or her claim, and to refer to the ultimate question of ownership as part of
the claimant's affirmative defense. That would make clear what has always
been the rule: a person with a "colorable interest" in the defendant property
is allowed in the courthouse door to litigate his claim, but once inside, the
claimant is required to show that he satisfies all of the indicia of ownership
as part of his affirmative defense. As the outcome in $9,041,598.68
illustrates, there will be claimants who are able to establish standing to
contest a forfeiture at the outset of the proceeding by showing that they
have a colorable interest in the property (e.g., by showing that their name
explaining that the claimant must prove his ownership interest by a preponderance
of the evidence).
100 See $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d at 245 ("[We consider Judge Atlas' post-
verdict discussion of standing as no more than arecognition of the fact that the jury
verdict defeated all possible claims of Massieu on the merits, and we find the trial
court's earlier determinations that Massieu had standing to be dispositive of that
issue").
Hooper, 229 F.3d at 818.
12 Id. at 823 n.4.
103 Id.
'14Id. (citing as authority $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d at 245).
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is on the title to the property, or that they have possession of it) yet they
will be unable to establish the requisite ownership interest under
§ 983(dX2XA) at trial.105
2. State v. Federal Law
The ownership of property is a matter traditionally governed by state
property law."° In forfeiture cases, however, the claimant must not only
show that she has an interest in the property under state law, but also that
her interest is protected from forfeiture under federal law."0 7 Stated
105 See United States v. 5 S. Tuthill Rd., 233 F.3d 1017, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000)
(as amended Mar. 21, 2001) (holding claimant had standing to contest forfeiture
but emphasizing that such holding did not determine, on remand, any aspect of the
innocent owner defense).
1s See United States v. 221 Dana Ave., 239 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding
that wife's interest in marital property is determined by State dower law); United
States v. 1980 LearJet, 25 F.3d 793,797 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that state law
determines existence and extent of lienholder's interest under 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(2)); In re Seizure of $82,000, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018-22 (W.D. Mo.
2000) (applying state law to determine if finder of abandoned property is an
"owner"); United States v. $9,041,598.68, 976 F. Supp. 633, 639-40 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (applying definition of"gift' under state law to determine if claimant was
"owner" of property received from family members and concluding that it was not
a "gifr" when donor intended to retain access to property), afid, 163 F.3d 238 (5th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 836 F. Supp. 1147, 1160 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (stating that "state law controls the question ofwhether a person is an owner
or not").
107 See 5. 351 TuthillRd, 233 F.3d at 1021 ("State law defines and classifies
property interests for purposes of the forfeiture statutes, while federal law
determines the effect of the property interest on the claimant's standing."); United
States v. $81,000.00, 189 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1999) ("State law determines [the
claimant's] ownership interest in the joint account, but then federal law determines
the effect of his ownership interest on his right to bring a claim.") (citations
omitted). The same rle applies in criminal forfeiture cases. See United States v.
Kennedy, 201 F.3d 1324, 1334-35 (1lth Cir. 2000); United States v. Lester, 85
F.3d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that when a claim is filed in an
ancillary proceeding, the court will look to state law to see what interest the
claimant has in the property, and then to the federal statute to see if that interest is
subject to forfeiture); United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), SA.
(Petition of American Express Bank I), 961 F. Supp. 287, 293 (D.D.C. 1997)
(holding that the claimant's interest in the property is a matter of state law, but the
consequences of that interest-i.e., whether that interest results in judgment in
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differently, state law is used to determine what interest, if any, a claimant
has in the forfeitable property, while federal law determines whether that
interest is sufficient to defeat the government's interest in the property
under the federal forfeiture statute.)°s
For example, state law is used to determine if the victim of a crime is
the owner of the subject property, or is only an unsecured creditor with a
generalized claim against the wrongdoer's estate. Federal law is then used
to determine whether all categories of victims, including general unsecured
creditors, and owner-victims, are ableto defeatthe government's interest."°
The consequence of this two-part inquiry is that a third-party claim can
fail for either of two reasons: 1) the claimant is unable to establish any
interest in the property as a matter of state law," ' or 2) the interest in
favor of claimant in the ancillary proceeding-is a question of federal law).
"o United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. (Final Order of
Forfeiture and Disbursement), 69 F. Supp. 2d 36, 57 (D.D.C. 1999) ("The nature
of the claimant's interest is determined by reference to applicable state property
law, but the determination of whether such an interest defeats the United States'
claim to the property... is a matter of federal law.").
1o9 See id. at 58 (explaining that state law determines if a creditor has a secured
or an unsecured interest and federal law determines which creditors can recover in
the ancillary proceeding).
110 See United States v. O'Brien, 181 F.3d 105 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished
table decision) (concluding that because claimant did not hold certificate of title to
forfeited automobile, she lacked any legal interest as a matter of state law, and so
could not challenge the forfeiture); United States v. Weaver, 89 F.3d 848 (9th Cir.
1996) (unpublished table decision) (affirming the district court's dismissal of
petition for failure to state a claim because spouse did not have a perfected interest
in forfeited property); United States v. Strube, 58 F. Supp. 2d 576, 584-85 (M.D.
Pa. 1999) (applying state law, and concluding that wife had no interest in real or
personal property titled in husband's name); United States v. Dempsey, 55 F. Supp.
2d 990,993 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (concluding that under state law, claimant who was
owed child support payments by defendant had no lien on defendant's property
until she levied on it); United States v. Antonelli (In re 837 Mass. Ave. N.), No. 95-
CR-200,1998 WL 775055, at* 1 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying state law to determine
if defendant's minor children had a legal interest in real property held exclusively
in defendant's name); United States v. Toma, No. 94 CR 333, 1997 WL 467280,
at *3 (N.D. MI1. Aug. 6, 1997) (holding that wife lacked standing because, under
state law, she had no legal interest in marital property held in husband's name);
United States v. 47 W. 644 Route 38,962 F. Supp. 1081, 1085-86 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(holding that a spouse who has no ownership interest in the other spouse's property
under state law has no standing); United States v. 2930 Greenleaf St., 920 F. Supp.
639,645-46 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (concluding that claimantwho failed to record interest
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question is not the kind of interest that Congress intended to protect. As
will be discussed later, claimants with interests defined by state property
law frequently find that the interest is insufficient because it does not
satisfy the temporal requirements, or bona fide purchaser provisions, of the
federal forfeiture statute."' Claimants may also find that their state law
property interests are simply excluded from the ambit of the innocent
owner defense because of the way in which the term "owner" is defined in
§ 983. The most common examples of this include unsecured creditors and
persons with nominal title to the defendant property who cannot show that
they ever exercised dominion or control over it." 2
Again, this is made clear by the definition of "owner" in § 983(d)(6)."'
Section 983(dX6XA) provides that an "owner" is "a person with an
ownership interest in the specific property [under state law] sought to be
forfeited, including a leasehold, lien, mortgage, recorded security interest,
or valid assignment of an ownership interest.""' But § 983(d)(6)(B)
provides that the term "owner" does not include-
(i) aperson with only a general unsecured interest in, or claim against,
the property or estate of another;,
(ii) a bailee unless the bailor is identified and the bailee shows a
colorable legitimate interest in the property seized; or
(iii) a nominee who exercises no dominion or control over the
property.1
5
Thus, whatever status a creditor, bailee, or nominee might otherwise be
accorded under state law, it will be insufficient to establish an ownership
interest as part of the affirmative defense under § 983(d).
Note that the exclusion of the three categories of persons from the
definition of "owner" in § 983 (dX6)(B) tracks or codifies the majority rule
in the property before the government filed lis pendens was not an "owner" under
state law).
" See infra Parts II.B.3, mI.C.
"
2 SeeUnited States v. Morgan, 224 F.3d339, 343 (4th Cir. 2000) (holdingthat
if a third-party claimant in a criminal forfeiture case exercises no dominion or
control over a joint bank account, the court may ignore the claimant's state law
interest in the property and deny his claim for failure to establish legal title or
interest under federal law); see also cases cited supra note 95.
11 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(6) (West Supp. 2000).
114 Id. § 983(d)(6)(A).
"I Id. § 983(d)(6)(B).
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in the pre-CAFRA case law. Under the old law, courts in both civil and
criminal forfeiture cases held that victims and other unsecured creditors
were not owners of forfeited property within the meaning of the federal
forfeiture statute. 16 Courts also held, based on the Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, which are applicable to civil
forfeiture proceedings, that bailees lacked standing as "owners" unless they
identified the bailor.117 In addition, courts held that mere title was
"' See United States v. Cambio Exacto, S.A., 166 F.3d 522, 528-29 (2d Cir.
1999) (concluding that a person to whom a money transmitter owes money lacks
standing as a general creditor to contest forfeiture of money transmitter's account);
United States v. $20,193.39 U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that general unsecured creditors lack standing); United States v. $15,060
in U.S. Currency, No. CIV. 97-1760-FR, 1999 WL 166847, at *1-2 (D. Or. 1999)
(granting government's motion for summary judgment because claimant who
allegedly loaned money to defendant, not knowing defendant intended to use it to
facilitate drug trafficking, was an unsecured creditor with no legal standing to
contest the forfeiture of the seized funds); United States v. $3,000, 906 F. Supp.
1061, 1066 (E.D. Va. 1995) (explaining that even though claimant/victim could
trace his money to seized bank account, title passed to perpetrator making claimant
an unsecured creditor without standing); seealso United States v. Ribadeneira, 105
F.3d 833,836-37 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that aperson holding check drawn on
defendant's forfeited bank account is a general unsecured creditor with no interest
in specific funds); United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. (Petition
of OAS), 73 F.3d 403, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that bank depositor was
only a general creditor of the defendant bank; therefore it was the defendant's
property, not the claimant's, that was forfeited); United States v. Schwimmer, 968
F.2d 1570, 1581 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Campos, 859 F.2d 1233 (6th Cir.
1988); United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. (Final Order of
Forfeiture and Disbursement), 69 F. Supp. 2d 36,58-59 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding
that a person who voluntarily transfers his property to the defendant is no longer
the owner of that property and the ability to trace property to defendant's assets is
irrelevant and that, therefore, victims who transferred their property to the
defendant were merely unsecured creditors, not owners of the forfeited property);
United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S-A- (Petition of Chawla), 46 F.3d
1185, 1191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that unsecured creditors are not owners);
Strube, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 581-82 (holding that family members who obtained a
judgment lien against defendant were general creditors, and not owners of any
interest in a specific parcel of property).
17 See United States v. $557,933.89 in U.S. Funds, No. 95-CV-3978,1998 WL
817651, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that there is no statutory standing under
Rule C(6) where bailee failed to identify the bailor); United States v. $205,991.00
in U.S. Currency, No. 97 Civ. 3520, 1997 WL 669839, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(dismissing claim because of bailee's failure to identify bailor in compliance with
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insufficient to establish an ownership interest if the claimant did not
exercise dominion and control over the property."' Thus, the pre-CAFRA
case law is still applicable in determining whether the claimant has
established an ownership interest in the defendant property as part of his
affirmative defense.
3. The Temporal Requirement
Next, note that the claimant not only must establish that she has an
ownership interest in the property within the meaning of both state law and
the federal statute, but also that her interest was "in existence at the time
the illegal conduct giving rise to forfeiture took place." 9 This temporal
requirement is entirely new to civil forfeiture law, and reflects the
distinction now being drawn between claimants with pre-existing interests
in the property and those with after-acquired interests. In other words, to
qualify for relief under § 982(dX2), the claimant must satisfy this temporal
requirement; otherwise she must recover as a bona fide purchaser under
§ 983(dX3).' 20
The temporal requirement was drawn from the criminal forfeiture
statute, which, since its inception, has always created separate grounds for
relief for claimants whose property interest was in existence atthe time the
crime giving rise to the forfeiture took place and those claimants who
acquired their interest afterwards.' 2' Thus, the case law interpreting the
temporal requirement in criminal cases is applicable to its parallel
requirement in § 983(dX2).11 In fact, the Ninth Circuit has already
observed that CAFRA has eliminated any distinction between the criminal
and civil forfeiture statutes on this point."n
Courts interpreting the temporal requirement in criminal forfeiture
cases have noted that it gives force and effect to the relation-back doctrine
by precluding recovery by third parties who did not acquire an interest in
the property until after the government's interest vested. 4 Hence, only
Rule C(6)).
"
8 See supra note 95.
!19 18 U.S.CA. § 983(d)(2)(A).
120 Id. § 983(d)(3).
121 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)-(B) (1994).
12 See United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that
§ 983(d) divides claimants into the same two categories as does the criminal
forfeiture statute and claimant who did not have an interest in the property at the
time of the offense must be a bona fide purchaser).
13Id.
"4 See id. at 821-22 (requiring the claimant, pursuant to § 853(n)(6)(A), to
show that the property interest was vested at the time the acts giving rise to the
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bona fide purchasers, who are covered by § 983(d)(3), can prevail in a
forfeiture action involving property in which the claimant had no interest
until after the crime giving rise to the forfeiture was completed. This cures
the problem created by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 92
Buena VistaAve. " and reestablishes the predominance of the relation back
doctrine over the innocent owner defense as Congress originally
intended. 2
6
The criminal cases provide numerous examples of instances where a
third-party claim failed because the claimant did not acquire his interest in
the forfeited property until after the crime giving rise to the forfeiture took
place. These third-party claimants include banks that did not exercise a
right of set-off against a customer's account until the funds in the account
were subject to forfeiture, 27 entities that did not exercise an option to buy
property until it was subject to forfeiture, 2 ' andjudgment creditors who did
not file a lien on the property until after it was subject to forfeiture. 9
forfeiture were committed, which prevented the defendant from transferring the
forfeitable property to anyone other than a bona fide purchaser); United States v.
BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. (Final Order ofForfeiture and Disbursement),
69 F. Supp. 2d 36, 60 (D.D.C. 1999) (stating that § 853(n)(6) subparagraphs (A)
and (B) are the procedural complements to the relation-back doctrine); United
States v. McClung, 6 F. Supp. 2d 548,552 (W.D. Va. 1998) (concluding thatunder
the relation-back doctrine, the government's interest in property involved in a drug
conspiracy vests when the conspiracy begins and that, therefore, to prevail under
§ 853(n)(6)(A), claimant must show that his interest was superior at that time).
'5 United States v. 92 BuenaVistaAve., 507 U.S. 111 (1993). For a discussion
of this case see supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
26S eeHooper, 229 F.3d at 822 (explaining that in 92 Buena Vista, the Supreme
Court was interpreting a statute that allowed a third party to recover irrespective of
when or how the third party acquired his or her interest in the property, and
concluding that the interpretation does not apply to a statute that limits recovery to
persons with pre-existing interests and to bona fide purchasers).
12' See United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. (Petition of
American Express Bank I1), 961 F. Supp. 287,295 (D.D.C. 1997) (concluding that
a bank that did not exercise right of setoff against defendant's assets until after
property was subject to forfeiture could not prevail under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(l)(6)(A), regardless of when order of forfeiture was issued).
11 See United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. (Petitions of
People's Republic of Bangladesh and Bangladesh Bank), 977 F. Supp. 1, 10-11
(D.D.C. 1997) (finding that holder of an option to buy defendant's property has no
legal interest until the option is exercised), af'd, 159 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
12 9 See United States v. Meister, No. 4.97-CR-120-G (N.D. Tex. May 18, 1999)
(holding that a victim who did not obtain a judgment lien against defendant's
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Most recently, the temporal requirement has been invoked to dispose
of third-party claims arising out of alleged marital interests in criminal
proceeds. For example, in United States v. Hooper,"3° the defendant's wife
claimed a community property interest in defendant's earnings from selling
drugs. The Ninth Circuit held that even if the claimant had a valid property
interest under state law, her claim failed under federal law because a
property interest in criminal proceeds can only come into existence after the
crime giving rise to the forfeiture occurs, and thus her claim was precluded
by the temporal requirement. 3 ' The panel noted that the temporal
requirement in the forfeiture statute meant, in all likelihood, that no person
could ever assert an interest as apre-existing owner in criminal proceeds.
property until after it was used to commit the offense could not recover under §
853(n)(6)(A));McClung, 6F. Supp. 2d at 552 (concluding that ajudgmentcreditor,
who filed a lien against defendant's property but had not yet levied against it, had
not acquired a superior interest in the property at the time it became subject to
forfeiture).
130Hooper, 229 F.3d at 818.
131M at 821-22 (explaining that to prevail under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A), the
claimant must have a pre-existing interest in the forfeited property, and since
proceeds do not exist before the commission of the underlying offense,
§ 853(n)(6)(A) can never be used to challenge the forfeiture of proceeds); see also
United States v. Martinez, 228 F.3d 587, 590-91 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
spouse cannot assert marital interest under § 853(n)(6)(A) in property acquired
with criminal proceeds because the relation-back doctrine bars the wife from ever
acquiring an interest in criminal proceeds); United States v. Kennedy, 201 F.3d
1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that wife does not have a superior interest
under § 853 (n)(6)(A) in property acquired as tenants by the entireties with proceeds
from fraudulent activities, because the property was subject to forfeiture before the
wife's interest came into existence); United States v. Brooks, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1035,
1041 (D. Haw. 2000) (concluding that a spouse cannot assert marital interest under
§ 853(n)(6)(A) in property acquired with criminal proceeds because such property
was necessarily acquired after the commission of the act giving rise to the
forfeiture); Rashid v. United States, Nos. CIV. A. 96-1987, 95-19326-SR, 1996
WL 421855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1996).32 Hooper, 229 F.3d at 821-22.
It is true, as the government points out, that this interpretation of §
853(n)(6)(A) leads inevitably to the conclusion that § 853(n)(6)(A) is likely
never to apply to proceeds of the crime. Section 853(n)(6)(A) is far better
designed to deal with instrumentalities of the crime. If a husband, for
example, uses the family car for drug trafficking, his spouse may qualify
under § 853(n)(6)(A) by showing that she had an interest in that car that
preceded the crime. Proceeds of crime, however, do not precede the crime.
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4. Alternative Grounds for Establishing Innocence
Section 983(dX2) is clearly disjunctive: a claimant can establish the
innocent owner defense by proving either that she did not know that her
property was involved in criminal activity orthat she did all that reasonably
*could be expected under the circumstances to terminate such use of the
property once she found out about it' 33 This, of course, codifies the
approach adopted by the majority of courts under the old law."
5. Knowledge and Willful Blindness
The knowledge prong of § 983(dX2XAXi) is the same as it was under
the old innocent owner defenses; 35 thus it is likely that the pre-CAFRA
case law defining "knowledge" will apply to the new statute.
Under pre-CAFRA law, the courts were divided over whether
"knowledge" meant actual knowledge or constructive knowledge.'36 By the
time CAFRA was enacted, however, a large number of courts-including
courts in the "actual knowledge" jurisdictions-had held that knowledge
includes the concept of "willful blindness."'37 So, although § 983(d) does
133 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(2) (West Supp. 2000).
"1 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
135 See 18 U.S.CA. § 983(d)(2)(A)(i).
136 See United States v. 1813 15th St., N.W., 956 F. Supp. 1029, 1035 (D.D.C.
1997) (noting that the circuits were split on whether to apply an "actual" or
"constructive" knowledge test). Compare United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d
895,906 (11 th Cir.1985) (holding that the innocent owner defense hinges upon the
claimant's actual, not constructive knowledge), with United States v. 755 Forest
Rd., 985 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[W]here an owner has engaged in 'willful
blindness' as to activities occurring on her property, her ignorance will not entitle
her to avoid forfeiture.").
137 See United States v. 3814 N.W. Thurman St, 164 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (9th
Cir. 1999) (holding that owner who is willfully blind to false statements made on
loan application is not an innocent owner under § 98 1(a)(1)(C) and (a)(2)); United
States v. 874 Gartel Drive, 79 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring claimant to
prove lack of knowledge and equating willful blindness with "knowledge'); 755
Forest Rd., 985 F.2d at 72; United States v. $1,646,000 in Cashiers Checks and
Currency, 118 F. Supp. 2d 977, 983 (N.D. Cal.) (following 874 Gartel Drive and
concluding that willful blindness is equal to knowledge), withdrawn, 123 F. Supp.
2d 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2000); United States v. 1948 Martin Luther King Drive, 91 F.
Supp. 2d 1228, 1246 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that family members who ate
willfully blind to drug dealer's source of income cannot be innocent owners of
property he titles in their names); United States v. 3775 Redcoat Way, No. 1: 98-
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not use the term "willful blindness," is it likely that the courts will, just as
they did under pre-CAFRA law, find that a person who willfully blinds
himself to the use of his property to commit a criminal offense is not an
innocent owner.""
Courts have expressed the concept of willful blindness in different
ways. In criminal cases, a person who is willfully blind to the facts has the
same state of mind as a person with actual knowledge of those facts.' In
a leading case, the Seventh Circuit stated that a person is willfully blind if
he is aware of suspicious circumstances and takes affirmative steps to
assure that he does not acquire full knowledge."4
In civil forfeiture cases, the Eleventh Circuit-adopted an objective due
care standard of willful blindness based upon the "all reasonable steps test"
set forth in Calero-Toledo41 Under this standard, a person would be
deemed willfully blind if he failed to exercise due care to ensure that his
property had not been used in illegal activity. The Third Circuit,
00124-CV-WBH (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 1999) (holding that a claimant's deliberate
ignorance of, or "willful blindness" to, the source of monies alleged illegally
obtained, is considered the equivalent of knowledge of the source of the monies),
affid without opinion, No. 99-12309 (1Ith Cir. Apr. 10, 2000); United States v.
$705,270.00 in U.S. Currency, 820 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding
that deliberate ignorance is equated with knowledge of the illegal activity), aff'd,
29 F.3d 640 (1 1th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. 1977 Porsche Carrera 911,
748 F. Supp. 1180, 1185 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (noting that even if claimant lacked
actual knowledge, he was not an innocent owner under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C)
if he was willfully blind), af'd, 946 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1991). As noted in the text,
§ 881(a)(4) was amended in 1988 to include an explicit reference to willful
blindness. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
'I See Franze, supra note 33, at 391 & n.108 (noting that "actual knowledge
incorporates the concept of 'willful blindness"' and that under pre-CAFRA law,
willful blindness applied to all forfeitures under § 881 even though only §
881(a)(4) (forfeiture of conveyances) made explicitreference to "willful blindness"
in its innocent owner provision).
139 Id. at 391 n.106 (citing United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-03 (9th
Cir. 1976)).
140 United States v. Giovanetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990).
'"' Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
'
42 See United States v. 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 888-89
(11th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account
90-3617-3,754 F. Supp. 1467, 1478 (D. Haw. 1991) (requiring claimant to prove
that"he did notknow of the illegal activity, did notwillfully blind himself from the
illegal activity, and did all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the illegal
use" of his property).
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however, rejected the objective due care standard and adopted a subjective
standard whereby a person is willfully blind if he is personally aware of a
high probability of illegal use of the property and does not take affirmative
steps to investigate.143
It is more difficult for the government to rebut an innocent owner
defense under a subjective standard than it is under an objective standard,
because the former requires the government to adduce circumstantial
evidence ofa claimant's knowledge of suspicious circumstances regarding
the use of his property, whereas the objective standard would be satisfied
by demonstrating what a reasonable person would have known. The Third
Circuit's subjective standard, however, is more favorable to the government
in some respects than the standards adopted by other circuits. For example,
in contrast to the Seventh Circuit's rule, the Third Circuit places the burden
on the person aware of the suspicious circumstances to take affirmative
steps to investigate; a person who fails to do so is willfully blind. In the
Seventh Circuit, a person apparently has no affirmative duty to investigate;
he is willfully blind only if he takes affirmative steps to avoid acquiring
guilty knowledge.
Because the innocent owner statute contains no definition of willful
blindness, it seems likely that this debate will continue as courts attempt to
apply the "knowledge" prong of § 983(dX2)(A).
141 United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 808 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting that willful blindness involves "a state of mind of much greater culpability
than simple negligence... and more akin to knowledge"); see also United States
v. $1,646,000 in Cashiers Checks and Currency, 118 F. Supp. 2d 977,985 (NJD.
Cal.) (following One 1973 Rolls Royce and explaining that "willful blindness
results when one is aware of a high probability of a fact and consciously avoids
seeking the truth because he desires to remain ignorant," and that it is a higher
standard than mere negligence), withdrawn, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (N.D. Cal.
2000); United States v. One 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (8th
Cir. 1992) ("[W]illful blindness involves an owner who deliberately closes his eyes
to what otherwise would have been obvious and whose acts or omissions show a
conscious purpose to avoid knowing the truth. This standard is a way of inferring
knowledge, whereas the Calero-Toledo standard is more nearly a negligence
standard."); All Monies ($477,048.62), 754 F. Supp. at 1477; 1977 Porsche
Carrera 911,748 F. Supp. at 1187-88 (explaining that a lawyerwhose fee was paid
with drug proceeds was "willfully blind" if he failed to take the basic investigatory
steps necessary to determine that his fees were not being satisfied with a major
instrumentality of the crime charged against his client).
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6. "All Reasonable Steps"
The second part of § 983(dX2XA)I" replaces the old "consent" prong
of the innocent owner defense with language that essentially codifies the
dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Calero-Toledo. " This is a
welcome clarification of the law, but it is not altogether new.
Under pre-CAFRA law, most courts interpreted the consent prong of
the innocent owner statute to mean that, in order to prove "lack of consent,"
the owner had to show that she took all reasonable steps to prevent the
illegal use of the property.1"6 In the circuits that read the innocent owner
provisions disjunctively, an owner who could make such a showing was
considered innocent, even if she knew that her property was being used for
144 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2000).
145 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying
text for a discussion about the dicta in Calero-Toledo.
146 See Yskamp v. DEA, 163 F.3d 767,773 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that charter
aircraft operator and its insurance company were not innocent owners where
neither took reasonable steps to ensure that the aircraft was not used for an
unlawful purpose); United States v. 121 Allen Place, 75 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir.
1996); United States v. 19 and 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1994)
(concluding that parents of an adult child consented to illegal use of their property
when they did not take every reasonable step to prevent such use); United States
v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1505 (1 lth Cir. 1992) (stating thatproof
of lack of consent "requires a claimant to show that he took all reasonable steps to
prevent illegal use ofhis property"); United States v. 141 st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870,
879 (2d Cir. 1990) (collecting cases and determining that it is appropriate to require
landlord to show that he did all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
illegal activity once he learned of it); United States v. 7079 Chilton County Rd.,
123 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (following 1012 Germantown Road);
United States v. 1813 15th St., N.W., 956 F. Supp. 1029, 1037 (D.D.C. 1997)
(concluding that taking "some" steps to bar drug dealers from property was not
sufficient and requiring landlady to take all reasonable steps, such as evicting
tenants convicted of drug offenses); United States v. One ParcelProperty at Lot 22,
No. 94-1264-JTM, 1996 WL 695404, at *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 14,1996); United States
v. 152 Char-Nor Manor Blvd., 922 F. Supp. 1064, 1069 (D. Md. 1996) (holding
that claimant, whose property was used to grow marijuana, could not show lack of
consent because she had failed to take "affirmative steps to prevent the property's
illegal use" by not cutting down the crop, forbidding boyfriend from using the
property, or changing the locks on her house), affd, 114 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1997);
United States v. 5.382 Acres, 871 F. Supp. 880, 884 (W.D. Va. 1994) ("Property
owners are required to meet a significant burden in proving lack of consent for they
must remain accountable for the use of their property.").
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an unlawful purpose. 4" Section 983(dX2XAXii) adopts that concept: a
person is an innocent owner, even if she knew of the illegal use of her
property, if"upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, [she]
did all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to
terminate such use of the property."'"
Because the "all reasonable steps" test was drawn from Calero-Toledo
and the cases that applied it to the consent prong of the pre-CAFRA
innocent owner defenses, the pre-CAFRA case law is directly applicable to
§ 983 (dX2XAXii). Note that under those cases, it was not sufficient for the
claimant to show that she took just some reasonable steps; rather, the
claimant was required to take "every action, reasonable under the
circumstances," to curtail the illegal use of her property.'49
In particular, courts held that it was not sufficient for a landlord, motel
owner, or other person who leased her premises to third parties, to show
that she had called the police when she learned that someone was
committing a criminal offense on the premises. To the contrary, a landlord,
motel owner, or other such person is required not only to call the police, but
to institute procedures that are likely to be effective in preventing continued
criminal activity. Such prodedures might include installing locks and other
security devices, restricting accessto the property to registered motel guests
or tenants, restricting access to non-public areas (such as the rear part of a
motel site), and evicting persons who are convicted ofa criminal offense. 5'
In § 983(dX2)(B), Congress attempted to flesh out this concept by
providing an illustration of what an owner might do to satisfy the "all
reasonable steps" test.'5 ' Under that provision, the f'mder of fact is
"
4
" See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
148 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(2)(A)(ii).
495.382Acres, 871 F. Supp. at 884 (quoting United States v. 418 57th St., 922
F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1990)).
'
50 See United States v. 1813 15th St., N.W., 956 F. Supp. 1029, 1037 (D.D.C.
1997) (holding that landlady who called the police but did not evict the tenants or
install locks and security devices did not do all that reasonably could be expected);
United States v. Lot Numbered One (1) of the Lavaland Annex, No. CIV 98-0295
LH/JHG (D.N.M. Feb. 22, 2000) (holding that motel owner must take "all
reasonable steps" to prevent the illegal use of his property and that calling the
police, by itself, is not sufficient, because owner could have erected a barrier to
prevent vehicles from gaining access to the rear of the motel property, hired a
security guard, and restricted occupancy at the motel to actual customers).
'5' Section 983(d)(2)(B) provides:
(i) For the purposes of this paragraph, ways in which a person may show
that such person did all that reasonably could be expected may include
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permitted152 to find that the person satisfied the requirements of
§ 983(d)(2)(AXi) if she: 1) called the police; and 2) in a timely fashion,
revoked (or made a good faith attempt to revoke) permission for the
wrongdoer to use the property, or took other reasonable actions to
discourage or prevent the illegal use.'"
demonstrating that such person, to the extent permitted by law-
(I) gave timely notice to an appropriate law enforcement agency of
information that led the person to know the conduct giving rise to a
forfeiture would occur or has occurred; and
(1) in a timely fashion revoked or made a good faith attempt to revoke
permission for those engaging in such conduct to use the property or
took reasonable actions in consultation with a law enforcement agency
to discourage or prevent the illegal use of the property.
(ii) A person is not required by this subparagraph to take steps that the
person reasonably believes would be likely to subject any person (other than
the person whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture) to physical danger.
18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2000).
152 Reliance on the illustration is clearly permissive, not mandatory. The
language in the statute, as enacted, contrasts with an earlier version of the same
provision, which created a "rebuttable presumption" that a person who took the
steps set forth in the statute was an innocent owner. That earlier version provided:
There is a rebuttable presumption that a property owner took all the steps
that a reasonable person would take if the property owner-
(A) gave timely notice to an appropriate law enforcement agency of
information that led [sic] the claimant to know the conduct giving rise
to a forfeiture would occur or has occurred; and
(B) in a timely fashion, revoked permission for those engaging in such
conduct to use the property or took reasonable steps in consultation with
a law enforcement agency to discourage or prevent the illegal use of the
property.
The person is not required to take extraordinary steps that the person
reasonably believes would be likely to subject the person to physical
danger.
H.R REP. No. 105-358, pt. 1, at 4 (1997), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 221. "The rebuttable presumption signifies the Committee's belief
that-absentunusual circumstances-an owner has taken all steps that areasonable
person would take ifhe has met the terms ofthe presumption." H. REP. No. 105-
358, at 31, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 245.
The decision to drop the rebuttable presumption in favor of language stating
that the ways in which a person could satisfy the "all reasonable steps" test may
include the two-part test in § 983(d)(2)(B) signifies that whether a person took all
reasonable steps remains a question for the finder of fact, based on all of the
attendant circumstances of the case.
15 See 18 U.S.CA. § 983(d)(2)(A)(i).
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This statutory provision is entirely consistent with the pre-CAFRA case
law which held that it is not sufficient for a person merely to alert the
police to the unlawful activity on her premises." Because § 983(dX2)(B)
has the conjunction "and" between clauses-(i)(I) and (II), it is clear that in
addition to "calling the cops," the property owner must evict or attempt to
evict the non-law abiding tenants or guests (or deny permission for the non-
law-abiding boyfriend or family member to continue to use the property),155
or must take "other reasonable actions," such as changing or installing
locks and other security devices, restricting access to the property, and so
forth.
Moreover, as § 983(dX2)(BXi)(II) indicates, such actions must be
"timely" and "in good faith." A drug dealer's girlfriend, for example,
cannot avail herself of the innocent owner defense under § 983(dX2) by
showing that she "called the cops" after law enforcement was already
aware of the drug dealer's activities. Nor would it be sufficient to revoke
permission for the drug dealer to use her car, house or other property after
the crime was complete. Finally, it would not be sufficient for the claimant
simply to state that she told the wrongdoer to stop whatever it was he was
doing. The requirement that the attempt to revoke permission be made in
"good faith" means that the property owner must do all that a person in her
situation could reasonably have done to prevent the illegal use of the
property. Whether the claimant did enough will, of course, be a matter for
the fimder of fact to decide.
The last sentence in § 983(d)(2)(BXii) provides that a property owner
is not required to take steps that the person "reasonably believes" would
expose the property owner (or someone else) to "physical danger." 156 This,
11 See, e.g., supra note 150. Similarly, if the claimant is advised by the police
that the illegal activity is taking place, the claimant must take affirmative steps to
stop the illegal activity, and may not rely on the notion that the police are aware of
the wrongdoing and that therefore the matter is out of the claimant's hands. See
United States v. 7079 Chilton County Rd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 602, 610 (M.D. Ala.
2000) (concluding that claimant who fails to take steps to stop family members
from engaging in drug sales after being apprized of situation by police is not an
innocent owner).
11 United States v. 19 and 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1994)
(concluding that parents of adult children could have prevented drug sales from
premises); 1813 15th St. N. W., 956 F. Supp. at 1037 (holding that landlady could
have evicted drug-dealing tenants); United States v. 152 Char-Nor Manor Blvd.,
922 F. Supp. 1064,1069 (D. Md. 1996) (noting that claimant could have forbidden
her boyfriend from using her property for a marijuana-growing operation), af'd,
114 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1997).
156 18 U.S.C.A. § 1983(d)(2)(B)(ii).
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of course, is merely a restatement of the general requirement in §
983(dX2XAXii) that the property owner do "all that reasonably could be
expected under the circumstances" to prevent the illegal use of the
property. 157 No one could be reasonably expected to deny a Colombian drug
lord holding an automatic weapon the use of her car, if it appeared that the
drug lord was prepared to use force to have his way."' But the standard is
nevertheless an objective one: the belief that there is a threat of physical
danger must be reasonable from the point of view of the finder of fact,
regardless of what the property owner subjectively believed to be at risk.
C. Persons with "After-Acquired" Interests
1. Bona Fide Purchasers
Section 983(dX3) deals with claimants whose alleged interest in the
property was "acquired after the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture [had]
taken place."' 9 As stated earlier, having the innocent owner defense for
civil forfeiture specifically address "after-acquired" interests represents a
major change in the law, and a major improvement for law enforcement."e
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court's decision in UnitedStates
v. 92 Buena VistaAve.'6' allowed criminals to insulate their property from
civil forfeiture simply by transferring itto a minor child, girlfriend, or some
other innocent owner. This occurred because, unlike the provision
protecting third-party rights in criminal forfeiture cases,"6 the civil
innocent owner statutes protected any "owner" and were not limited to
"bona fide purchasers for value.""' Thus, an innocent donee could file a
successful claim.
Moreover, as interpreted by the Third Circuit in United States v. One
1973 Rolls Royce, 6' the state of mind of the claimant was evaluated as of
17 Id. § 1983(d)(2)(A)(ii).
..8 Cf 7079 Chilton County Rd., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (emphasizing that
whether a claimant has "taken all reasonable steps" must be viewed in light of
claimant's circumstances, but claimant who takes no steps to stop family members
from engaging in drug sales after being apprized of situation by police is not an
innocent owner).
1s9 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(3).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
1 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111 (1993).
S62 ee supra note 53 and accompanying text
163 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (1994) (protecting "bona fide purchaser for
value").
'" See 92 Buena Vista, 507 U.S. at 112.
16s United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794 (3d Cir. 1994).
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the time the crime occurred, not the time the claimant became the owner of
the property." Thus, all post-illegal act transferees in that circuit were
considered innocent owners per se.'67 As mentioned earlier, most other
courts have held that the claimant's state of mind must be determined as of
the time the property was transferred to the claimant.' s
Section 983(dX3XA) addresses both of these problems by adopting the
language of the bona fide purchaser provision in the criminal forfeiture
statute and making it applicable to after-acquired interests in civil forfeiture
cases. Under § 983(dX3XA), a post-illegal act transferee is an innocent
owner if, "at the time that person acquired an interest in the property," 169
the person-
(i) was abona fide purchaser or seller for value (including a purchaser
or seller of goods or services for value); and
(ii) did not know and was reasonably without cause to believe that the
property was subject to forfeiture.170
Notice first that the state of mind of the innocent owner is evaluated at
the time that person acquired an interest in the property. This disposes of
the One 1973 Rolls Royce problem, and follows the majority rule on this
issue.
Second, because the bona fide purchaser requirement- is virtually
identical to the requirement in the criminal statute, 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(nX6)(B), the case law interpreting the bona fide purchaser
requirement in criminal forfeiture cases should be applicable to the
new statute. In criminal forfeiture cases, the bona fide purchaser
provision has been interpreted to have the same meaning it would
have in commercial law.'" That is, to be a "bona fide purchaser," the
'Id. at 817.
167 Id.
'6 See cases cited supra note 57.
169 18 U.S.CA. § 983(d)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
1 Id. § 983(d)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
171 Section 853(n)(6)(B) provides that a third party may challenge a criminal
forfeiture order if "the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right,
title, or interest in the property and was at the time of purchase reasonably without
cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section." 21
U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (1994).
172 See H.- REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, at 32, repinted in U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 245 ("The term 'bona fide purchaser' is derived from commercial
law. It includes any person who gives money, goods or services in exchange for the
property subject to forfeiture, but it does not include general unsecured creditors
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claimant "must give something of value in exchange for the property."'
'
Obviously, this excludes donees who receive the property without
giving anything in return, 74 and spouses who obtain an interest in
the property through the operation of marital property law or a di-
vorce or separation agreement.175 It also excludes heirs and others
who inherit the property from a decedent,176 and unsecured credi-
who acquire only a debt."). See generally Stefan D. Cassella, Third Party Rights
in Criminal Forfeiture Cases, 32 CRIM. L. BULL. 499, 528-30 (Nov.-Dec. 1996).
17 H.R. REP. No. 105-358, at 32, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra
note 4, at 245; see United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), SA. (Final
Order of Forfeiture and Disbursement), 69 F. Supp. 2d 36, 62 (D.D.C. 1999)
(concluding that a judgment creditor who obtains a lien on defendant's property
was notabonafide purchaser because he gave nothing of value in exchange for the
lien, irrespective or how the antecedent debt came into existence); United States v.
BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), SA. (Petition of American Express Bank 11), 961
F. Supp. 287,295 (D.D.C. 1997) (concluding that the bank's exercise of a right of
setoff against defendant's account was not a "purchase"); United States v. BCCI
Holdings (Luxembourg), SA. (Petition of Capital Bank), 980 F. Supp. 10, 15
(D.D.C. 1997); United States v. Infelise, 938 F. Supp. 1352, 1368 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(holding that wife was not a bona fide purchaser of property husband placed in her
name because she gave nothing of value in exchange for the property), rev'd on
other grounds, 159 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hentz, No. CR.A. 90-
00276-03, 1996 WL 355327, at *10 (ED. Pa. June 20, 1996) (holding that
defendant's mother, who gave no value for property held in her name, and who
understood the currency reporting requirements that defendant violated, was not
abonafide purchaser); United States v. Sokolow, No. CRIM. 93-394-01,1996 WL
32113, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1996) (explaining that wife was not a bona fide
purchaser if she gave no value for the property and that a separation agreement was
not giving value); id. at *21 (explaining daughter was not a bona fide purchaser
because she received property as a gift knowing father had been indicted); United
States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), SA. (Petitions of Trade Creditors), 833
F. Supp. 22, 28 (D.D.C. 1993) (concluding that creditor was not a "purchaser"
because nothing was given in exchange for a specific interest in the tangible
property).74 See Infelise, 938 F. Supp. at 1368.
75 See United States v. Brooks, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1041 (D. Haw. 2000)
(holding that wife cannot assert a BFP interest in husband's criminal proceeds on
the ground that she contributed uncompensated services that increased the value of
the marital estate); Sokolow, 1996 WL 32113, at *20.
76 An heir is not a "purchaser" because the heir gives nothing of value in
exchange for the property. As noted infra note 200, heirs are exempted from the
purchaser requirement in certain circumstances where the primary residence is
involved. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 2000). The exemption
only applies, of course, if the heir "did not know and was reasonably without cause
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tors,'" including judgment creditors who obtain an interest in the property
by filing a lien against it,"78 or banks that obtain an interest in a depositor's
assets by exercising a statutory right to take a set-offagainst the customer's
account. 79
In the case of judgment creditors, banks taking set-offs, and others
whose claim against the defendant property is based on an antecedent debt,
it makes no difference how the debt arose, or that it arose from an arms-
length business transaction."8 Whatever the nature of that business
transaction may have been, all the creditor received in exchange for
whatever he gave the debtor was a debt-a cause of action to sue for breach
of contract; he did not receive any interest in the specific property subject
to forfeiture. That interest, if it exists at all, arose later when the creditor
obtained a judgment lien or exercised a right of set-off against the
to believe the property was subject to forfeiture" at the time the heir acquired her
interest in the property. Id. § 983(d)(3)(B)(ii). Thus, the rule created by the First
Circuit under pre-CAFRA law thatawife may acquire her husband's interest in the
family residence, following the husband's suicide, even though she knew, at the
time of his death, that the residence was subject to forfeiture, would not apply to
a pre-CAFRA case. See United States v. 221 Dana Ave., 239 F.3d 78 (1st Cir.
2001).
11 Section 983(d)(6)(B) specifically excludes general unsecured creditors from
the definition of owner. 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(6)(B). This codifies the pre-CAFRA
case law holding that creditors are not bona fide purchasers. See United States v.
Ribadeneira, 105 F.3d 833,835-36 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding thatperson holding
check drawn on defendant's forfeited bank account was not a bona fide purchaser
of any specific assets); United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177, 185-87 (3d Cir. 1991)
(explaining that tort victims were not bona fide purchasers); United States v.
Campos, 859 F.2d 1233, 1238 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a trade creditor was not
a bona fide purchaser); United States v. McClung, 6 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551 (W.D.
Va. 1998) (explaining that hospital that provided medical services to defendantwas
a general unsecured creditor and not a "purchaser" of defendant's property, even
though the provision of services did constitute giving value); BCCI (Petition of
American Express BankH1), 961 F. Supp. at 295; United States v. BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg), S.A. (Petition of Chawla), 46 F.3d 1185,1191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(explaining that general creditors were not bona fide purchasers); BCCI (Petitions
of Trade Creditors), 833 F. Supp. at 28.
78 See BCCI (Final Order ofForfeiture and Disbursement), 69 F. Supp. 2d at
62.
79 See BCCI (Petition of Capital Bank), 980 F. Supp. at 15; BCCI (American
Express Bank 1), 961 F. Supp. at 295.
' See BCCI (Final Order ofForfeiture and Disbursement), 69 F. Supp. 2d at
61-62.
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particular asset that is now subject to forfeiture. But placing a judgment
lien on a piece of property, or taking a set-offagainst a bank account, is not
a new purchase, and a person who acquires his interest in that fashion is
therefore not a bona fide purchaser for value under § 983(dX3XA)."'
The third thing to notice about § 983(dX3XA) is that the bona fide
purchaser requirement has two parts. Not only must the claimant be a
"purchaser" in the commercial sense, but he must also show that at the time
of the purchase he "did not know and was reasonably without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture." 2 This provision is also
taken directly from the criminal forfeiture statute."2
In criminal forfeiture cases, a third party who acquires an interest in the
forfeited property after the act giving rise to the forfeiture has been
completed must show that he had no reason to know that the property was
involved in a crime committed by another person. Thus, if the third party
knows at the time he acquires his interest in the property that the previous
owner of the property used it to commit a crime, or was accused of having
used the property to commit a crime, the third party cannot challenge the
forfeiture as a bona fide purchaser.' It is immaterial how the third party
became aware of the taint on the property, whether from first-hand
18 1 See BCCI (Final Order ofForfeiture andDisbursement), 69 F. Supp. 2d at
62.
A creditor who attempts to satisfy the debt by obtaining ajudgment lien, or
exercising a right of set-off, against specific property is not a bona fide
purchaser of that property because he has given nothing of value in
exchange for the property interest. This is so irrespective of how the
antecedent debt came into existence.
Id.; McClung, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (holding that hospital that provided medical
services to defendant was a general unsecured creditor and not a "purchaser" of
defendant's property, even though the provision of services did constitute giving
value); BCCI (American Express Bank L9, 961 F. Supp. at 295 (concluding that
bank's exercise of set-off against defendant's account was not a "purchase' even
though bank was attempting to satisfy debt incurred when it sold property to
defendant as part of a foreign exchange transaction).
182 18 U.S.CA. § 983(d)(3)(A)(ii).
183 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (1994).
184 See United States v. Hentz, No. CR.A. 90-00276-03, 1996 WL 355327, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 1996) (holding that defendant's mother, who understood the
currency reporting requirements that defendant violated, was not a bona fide
purchaser); United States v. Sokolow, No. CRIM. 93-394-01, 1996 WL 32113, at
*21 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1996) (concluding that daughter was not a bona fide
purchaser because she received property as a gift knowing father had been
indicted).
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knowledge, from reports in the media, or because the property was
specifically named in an indictment, lis pendens, restraining order, or some
other action by the government. If the information available to the third
party would have put a reasonable person on notice that the property was
subject to forfeiture, he cannot claim to be a bona fide purchaser.185
For example, in the case involving the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International ("BCCr'),' 6 the court held that a U.S. bank which continued
to do business with BCCI and acquired an interest in BCCI's property after
the widespread publicity regarding BCCI's fraudulent banking practices
was not a bona fide purchaser of the property subsequently forfeited by
BCCI in a criminal case."87
Similarly, a defense attorney cannot assert an innocent owner defense
under § 983(dX3XA) to the forfeiture of the fee paid to him by his client,
if at the time the attorney accepted the fee he knew that the client was
accused of a crime that generated a sum of money as proceeds, and that
those proceeds were the likely source of the fee.'
Is See United States v. Register, 182 F.3d 820, 836 (11th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that the government may use a lis pendens to preserve its interest in
property subject to forfeiture pending trial, because lis pendens puts potential
purchaser on notice that the property is subject to forfeiture, citing United States
v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 58 (1993)); id. at 837 (explaining
that if property was named in an indictment as subject to forfeiture, a person aware
of the indictment could not be a bona fide purchaser); In re Moffitt, Zwerling &
Kemler, P.C., 846 F. Supp. 463,472 (E.D. Va. 1994) (requiring third party's claim
that there was no cause to believe property was subject to forfeiture to be "objec-
tively reasonable"), affid, United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83
F.3d 660,665-66 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding law firm had reason to know that the
fee it received was subject to forfeiture). But see United States v. 2659 Roundhill
Drive, 194 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a purchaser who takes
property knowing it is subject to lis pendens may still qualify as innocent owner,
because lis pendens only puts purchaser on notice of pending lawsuit and it does
not put purchaser on notice that property was used to commit a crime).
116 BCCI (Petition ofAmerican Express Bank I), 961 F. Supp. at 287.
187 Id. at 300 (explaining that, given the extensive public record of defendant's
misconduct, claimant knew or should have known that defendant's assets were
subject to forfeiture and noting that the standard is objective reasonableness).
'
88 See Moffitt, 83 F.3d at 665-66; Register, 182 F.3d at 820; United States v.
McCorkle, No. 6:98-CR-52-ORL-19C, 2000 WL 133759, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14,
2000) (concluding that defense attorney was not a bona fide purchaser if he was
aware that his fee was subject to forfeiture because of the terms of an indictment
or from his objective assessment of the law and the facts of the case); United States
v. Matta-Timmins, 81 F. Supp. 2d 193, 196 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting in dicta that
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The same rule should apply in civil forfeiture cases under §
983(dX3)(A).1  The only difference is that because civil forfeitures are
broader in scope than criminal forfeitures (not limited to the defendant's
property), what the third party has to show to establish an innocent owner
defense will be correspondingly broader as well. Whereas, in a criminal
case, it is arguable that the third party only has to show that he had no
reason to believe that the previous owner (the criminal defendant) used the
property to commit an offense, in a civil case, the claimant must show that
he had no reason to believe that anyone had used the property to commit an
offense. Again, that is because in a civil forfeiture case the property can be
subject to forfeiture on account of the acts of any person who used the
property to commit a crime; the act giving rise to forfeiture need not have
been committed by the prior owner.
Therefore, if a person buys a car from the sister of a notorious drug
dealer, knowing at the time ofthe purchase that the drug dealer used the car
in his drug operation, the buyer is not a bona fide purchaser under §
983(dX3XA). In other words, it would be no defense for the buyer to say
that the sister-the person who sold him the car-was not, to his
knowledge, involved in any criminal act.
2. Bona Fide Sellers
One peculiarity in § 983(dX3XA) is that it defines an innocent owner
to include a "purchaser or seller for value (including a purchaser or seller
of goods or services for value)."'" What is the difference between a bona
fidepurchaser for value, and a bona fide seller for value? There is none.
For purposes of the forfeiture law, a person who pays money in
exchange for goods and services can be a bona fide purchaser, but so can
a vendor who sells goods and services in exchange for money. In the latter
case, the vendor is a bona fide purchaser of the money that he received in
exchange for his goods or services. For example, if Seller sells Buyer a
truck for $10,000 in cash, and the government tries to forfeit either the
truck or the cash, Buyer can claim to be the bona fide purchaser of the
truck, and Seller can claim to be the bona fide purchaser of the cash.
Because each gave value in exchange for the property he received, each is
protected from forfeiture, as long as he had no reason to believe that the
property he acquired was subject to forfeiture.
if defendant pleads guilty the fee that she paid to defense counsel maybe forfeited).
119 See cases at supra note 57.
190 18 U.S.C-.A § 983(d)(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2000).
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Thus, it was not necessary to make explicit reference to "sellers" in the
statute to protect innocent vendors, and a simple protection for "bona fide
purchasers" would have been sufficient The reference to sellers adds
nothing to the scope ofthe innocent owner defense. The reason the explicit
reference was included in the statute was that criminal defense lawyers
wanted it made clear that they could assert a defense under § 983(d)(3XA)
ifthe government tried to forfeit their attorneys fees. Like any other vendor,
a defense attorney who sells his services in exchange for a fee is considered
a purchaser of the fee. Thus, defense attorneys would have been able to
assert a "bona fide purchaser" defense under § 983(dX3XA) whether the
statute referred to "sellers" or not.
The problem defense attorneys have always had in defending against
attorney-fee forfeitures in criminal forfeiture cases was not that there is a
distinction between "purchasers" and "sellers," but rather the reality that
an attorney for a criminal defendant typically is well aware that the fee
received from the client was derived from the crime with which the client
had been accused.19" ' Thus, the defense attorney could not prove that he "did
not know and was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was
subject to forfeiture."'19 With the inclusion of that requirement in §
983(d)(3)(A), it will be just as difficult for an attorney to establish an
innocent owner defense under CAFRA as it was under the old law.
3. Black Market Currency Cases
As mentioned earlier, the requirement that the claimant be without any
reason to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture was viewed by
the drafters of the legislation as essential to the government's effort to
combat the selling of drug proceeds on the black market in South
America. 9
In black market cases, drug dealers sell their cash proceeds to money
brokers who, in turn, sell it to South American importers or wealthy
persons who need to convert local currency to U.S. dollars. In such cases,
law enforcement officials typically trace the drug money into the bank
accounts of these black market customers, who claim that they are only
191 See cases at supra note 188; cf Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (addressing civil forfeiture of attorney's fees).
192 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(3)(A)(ii).
193 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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engaged in the exchange of local currency for U.S. dollars, and thus do not
know or care where the dollars come from. 9'
In fact, it is common knowledge throughout much of Central and South
America and the Caribbean that narco-trafficking is the primary-if,
indeed, not the only-source of cheap U.S. dollars (i.e., dollars available
below the official exchange rate) that are routinely purchased on the black
market." 5 Thus, black market customers are on notice that the money they
are receiving is likely to be subject to forfeiture. Under the second part of
§ 983(d)(3XA),'" such a person would not be considered an innocent
owner, even if such a person could show that goods or local currency were
exchanged for U.S. dollars, unless he also could show that in light of the
circumstances of the transaction he did all that a person would be expected
to do to guard against the acquisition of the proceeds of drug trafficking. 97
19 The process by which drug dollars are sold to importers and others through
the Black Market Peso Exchange is described in detail in the testimony of Assistant
Attorney General James Robinson before the House Subcommittee on Crime,
February 10, 2000, availableathttp://www.house.gov/judiciary/robiO2O.htm. See
also United States v. Cuartas,No. 99-0675-CR-MIDDLEBROOKS (S.D. Fla. Mar.
27, 2001) (report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge) (holding that person
exchanging dollars for local currency was not an innocent owner); Stefan D.
Cassella, MoneyLaundering Through the BMPE, ASSET FORFEITURENEWS, Mar.-
Apr. 2000, at 1; FinCENAdvisory: Colombian BlackMarket Peso Exchange (Fin.
Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Vienna, VA), Nov.
1997.
In UnitedStates v. $57,443.00,42 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (S.D. Fla. 1999), affd, 240
F.3d 1077 (1lth Cir. 2000), the government used the totality of the circumstances
to establish that the currency delivered by a known money launderer to a third
party in a Black Market Peso Exchange transaction was drug proceeds, but the
court allowed the third party to assert an innocent owner defense at trial.
19 See United States v. Basler Turbo-67, 906 F. Supp. 1332, 1338 (D. Ariz.
1995) (explaining that aperson who knows that property was purchased with funds
traceable to the black market in Colombia is not an innocent owner, because it is
common knowledge that black market funds come from drug dealing in that
country), rev'd, 78 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 1996).
196 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(3)(A)(ii).
197 SeeUnited States v. All Monies ($477,048.62), 754F. Supp. 1467, 1478 (D.
Haw. 199 1) (holding that Peruvian money exchanger, who deposited drug dollars
that he purchased on the black market into a U.S. bank account, had to prove "that
he did not know of illegal activity, did not willfully blind himself to illegal activity,
and did all that reasonably could be expected to prevent illegal use" of his
property); United Statesv. Cuartas,No. 99-0675-CR-MIDDLEBROOKS (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 27,2001) (report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge); 1996Hearings,
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The relevant circumstances would include the claimant's knowledge of the
source of the U.S. dollars on the local black market, the identity and
background of the person from whom he obtained the dollars, and the
details of the transaction, including the degree to which the dollars were
available at a price below the official exchange rate, whether such
transactions are legal under local law, whether the dollars were obtained
in cash or in bundles of low-value personal checks or travelers checks,
or whether the dollars were wired to the claimant from an unknown
source.
198
For example, if instead of going to a bank to obtain U.S. dollars at the
official exchange rate, a South American businessman goes to a money
broker and buys dollars at a cheaper rate, and obtains the money in bundles
of cash, or in sequentially numbered travelers checks, or in groups of small-
denomination third party checks, he would be on notice that the money is
likely to be subject to forfeiture, and would be able to defeat a civil
forfeiture action only by showing that in light of these circumstances he did
everything a reasonable person in his situation would have done to assure
himself that the money broker was not selling him drug money.
South American importers who purchase dollars on the black market
often do so because they need the dollars to pay for the imported goods.
Frequently, the importer gives local currency to the money broker and
directs the money broker to pay the exporter directly. Thus, in many cases,
law enforcement agents trace the drug proceeds not to the importer's bank
account, but to an exporter in the United States, Europe or Asia. In such
cases, the exporter receives payment on the invoice not from his customer,
but from a third party with whom the exporter has had no prior dealing. In
such cases, any exporter who is at all familiar with the nature of the black
market would be on notice that the payment may consist of funds subject
to forfeiture. Thus, if the government brings a civil forfeiture action against
the funds in the exporter's account, the exporter would be able to assert an
innocent owner defense under § 983(dX3XA) only ifhe took all reasonable
steps under the circumstances to determine the source of the third-party
payment. In fact, courts might consider a bright-line rule for such cases,
holding that no one engaged in international trade with drug producing
countries in South America be considered an innocent owner of drug
proceeds that were received from an unknown third-party payor.
supra note 24, at 65, 226, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 35,
116.
'
98 SeeUnited States v. Cuartas, No. 99-0675-CR-MIDDLEBROOKS (S.D.Fla.
Mar. 27, 2001) (report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge).
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4. Exception to the Bona Fide Purchaser Requirement for Residences
There is one substantive difference between the purchaser requirement
in § 983(dX3) and its criminal forfeiture counterpart. The criminal statute,
§ 853(nX6)(B), contains no exceptions: persons who are bona fide
purchasers are able to file claims while persons who acquire the property
by other means are not.19 The civil statute, however, contains a narrow
exception for property used as a primary residence.2 0
In the original version of CAFRA introduced in 1999, Representative
Henry Hyde proposed to exempt all innocent heirs of a deceased criminal
from the "purchaser" requirement.20 1 The notion was that it was
"fundamentally unfair" to place an innocent heir in the position of having
to rebut the government's evidence that the property was subject to
forfeiture on account of past acts committed by the decedent. 2 Thus, the
bill passed by the House in 1999 provided that an innocent owner included
both bona fide purchasers and "person[s] who acquired an interest in
property through probate or inheritance."' 3
In his testimony in opposition to the House-passed version of the bill,
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder told the Senate Judiciary Committee
that the exception to the purchaser requirement for innocent heirs meant
that ifa Colombian drug trafficker was killed in a shoot-out with the police,
his heirs would be entitled to keep all of his drug proceeds.20" The Justice
199 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (1994).
200 18 U.S.CA. § 983(d)(3)(B)(i).
201 H.R. REP. No. 106-192, at 16 (1999), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 280.202 Id.
203 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999), 145
CONG. REC. H4877 (1999), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at
3 46,04 Under the House bill, ifa criminal dies, his fortune passes directly to his
heirs without fear of forfeiture, even if the money consists entirely of
criminal proceeds. A major drug dealer or pornographer could amass a
fortune over a lifetime of crime, and pass it on to his heirs without the
government's being able to step in and confiscate the money. The same is
true if even the criminal proceeds were taken by fraud from innocent
victims, thereby granting the fraud artist's heirs priority over the victims of
his crimes. The heirs of a drug lord killed in a shoot out with the police or
with a rival drug gang should not be free to inherit his drug fortune.
Over the past decade, we have recovered over $70 million from the
estate of the notorious drug lord Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha after he
was killed by the Colombian police. UnderH.R. 1658, Gacha's heirs would
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Department thus offered a counter-proposal, identical to its 1996 and 1997
proposals, that contained no exception to the purchaser requirement.2 5
Ultimately, the Senate decided upon a compromise based on language
from a bill that Mr. Hyde had introduced in 1997 and later abandoned.2
That provision created an exception to the "purchaser" requirement that
was limited to one narrow situation: where "the property is real property,
the owner is the spouse or minor child of the person who committed the
offense giving rise to forfeiture, and the owner uses the property as a
primary residence."20" In such cases, the compromise language provided
that "a valid innocent owner claim shall not be denied because the owner
acquired the interest through the dissolution of marriage or by operation of
law (in the case of a spouse) or by inheritance upon the death of a parent
(in the case of a minor child)."2 °" The 1997 House Committee Report
emphasized, however, that "[tlo be considered an innocent owner, the
spouse or minor child must have been reasonably without cause to believe
that the property was subject to forfeiture at the time of the acquisition of
his interest in the property."2°
The version of the compromise adopted by the Senate in 2000, and
ultimately enacted into law, is codified in § 983(dX3)(B). Though much
more complicated in its structure, it says essentially the same thing as the
1997 compromise language discussed above. The provision provides that
the claim of a person who would otherwise have a "valid claim" under
subparagraph (3XA)-in other words, a person who would prevail as a
bona fide purchaser-cannot be denied on the ground that the person gave
nothing of value in exchange for the property, so long as the following
criteria are established:
(i) the property is the primary residence of the claimant;
(ii) depriving the claimant of the property would deprive the claimant
of the means to maintain reasonable shelter in the community for the
claimant and all dependents residing with the claimant;
have been entitled to all his drug money.
1999 Hearings, supra note 69 (testimony of Eric Holder), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 354.
2
"5Id. (material submitted by Eric Holder), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 358.
206 ee H.R. REP. No. 105-358, pt. 1, at 4 (1997), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 221.
207 Id. at 32, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 245.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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(iii) the property is not, and is not traceable to, the proceeds of any
criminal offense; and
(iv) the claimant acquired his or her interest in the property through
marriage, divorce, or legal separation, or the claimant was the spouse or
legal dependent of a person whose death resulted in the transfer of the
property to the claimant through inheritance or probate.210
Again, the purpose of this provision is to relieve the claimant of having
to satisfy the purchaser requirement: if a person otherwise satisfies all of
the criteria set forth in the exception, she may be considered an innocent
owner of after-acquired property even though she did not give anything of
value in exchange for the property. As mentioned, heirs and spouses
generally cannot satisfy the bona fide purchaser requirement because they
give nothing ofvalue in exchange for the property. Thus, the provision was
intended to expand the scope of the innocent owner defense for the benefit
of heirs and spouses where their primary residence is subject to forfeiture.
Of course, as discussed previously, eliminating the purchaser requirement
in such cases does not relieve the claimant of the burden of having to show,
pursuant to § 983(d)(3XAXii), that she did not know, and was reasonably
without cause to believe, that the property was subject to forfeiture.2
There are many noteworthy aspects to the exception to the purchaser
requirement in § 983(d)(3)(B). First, these requirements are conjunctive
and the claimant must prove all of these points. Second, this provision
applies only to "the primary residence of the claimant." There is no
exception to the purchaser requirement for vacation properties, second
homes, land held for investment, or any other kind of real or personal
property. Third, the forfeiture would have to result in the claimant having
no other place to live. Clearly, this is designed to avoid causing the drug
dealer's spouse and children to be homeless. If the heirs of the deceased
drug lord have alternative means of "maintaining reasonable shelter in the
community," the exception to the purchaser requirement does not apply.
Fourth, the exception only applies if the residence is forfeitable because it
was property used to facilitate the crime. If the theory of forfeiture is that
the residence is property traceable to the proceeds of the crime, the
exception does not apply. Forfeiture of criminal proceeds, in other words,
is barred only if the claimant is a bona fide purchaser, even if the proceeds
have been invested in a primary residence. Fifth, the exception only applies
to transfers that occur as a result of the death of the property owner or the
210 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2000).
211 See supra note 176.
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transfer of property rights as a result of marriage, separation, or divorce.
Thus, if the drug dealer dies and leaves the primary residence to the
innocent spouse and children, and the other criteria are satisfied, the heirs
can assert an innocent owner defense. Or, if awoman marries a drug dealer
and thereby acquires an interest in his primary residence as community
property or otherwise under state law, and the other criteria are satisfied,
she can assert the defense. If the drug dealer then divorces his wife, and
gives her the primary residence as part ofthe divorce or separation, and the
other criteria are satisfied, she can assert the defense. But there is no
exception to the purchaser requirement for property transferred as a gift or
placed in trust, or otherwise conveyed to a family member.
In all of the cases where the exception does apply, the heir or spouse
still has to be "innocent" at the time of transfer. That is, because the
exception in § 983(d)(3XB) is only an exception to the "purchaser"
requirement in § 983(dX3XAXi), the claimant still has to be "reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture... at
the time that person acquired the interest in the property" as required in
§ 983(dX3XAXii). Thus, the exception does not permit a criminal to
insulate her primary residence from forfeiture by transferring itto a spouse
as part of a separation agreement, if the spouse had cause to believe, at the
time of the transfer, that the property was subject to forfeiture. Similarly,
the heirs of a drug dealer do not get to keep the residence if, at the time of
her death, the heirs knew the decedent was a drug dealer who used the
house to facilitate crimes. '13
Even if all of these conditions are satisfied--e.g., there is an innocent
spouse who gets the primary residence in a divorce without having any idea
that it was used in the past to facilitate drug trafficking-the court still must
limit the claimant's recovery "to the value necessary to maintain
reasonable shelter in the communityfor such claimant and all dependents
residing with the claimant."2 4 This was one last provision added by the
congressional staffto make sure that no one-however innocent-was able
to inherit an opulent estate that had been used to facilitate drug trafficking.
In that instance, the court is apparently required to liquidate the property
and give the claimant only so much as she needs to find another place in the
community affording "reasonable shelter." The government recovers the
balance.
212 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(3)(A)(ii).
213 For this reason, the holding in United States v. 221 Dana Ave., 239 F.3d 78
(1st Cir. 2001), would not apply to a post-CAFRA case. See supra note 176.
214 18 U.S.CA. § 983(d)(3)(B)(iv) (emphasis added).
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With all of the requirements and limitations in the statute, it is clear
that the exception to the purchaser requirement in § 983(d)(3)(B) will
apply in only the narrowest and rarest circumstances. Nevertheless, the
government can avoid all ofthe litigation § 983(dX3)(B) is likely to create
simply by undertaking the forfeiture of a primary residence as a criminal
forfeiture whenever it is possible to do so. Nothing in § 983(dX3)(B), in
other words, creates any exception to the purchaser requirement in §
853(nX6)(B).215
D. Severing the Property
Finally, § 983(dX5) contains a provision describing how the court
might resolve issues that arise when it finds that the property is forfeitable
in part to the United States, but must be returned in part to an innocent
owner.2?16 This issue has caused no small amount of confusion in the case
law.
In the typical case, the court (orjury) might find that a drug dealer used
his residence or farm to store, produce or distribute cocaine, marijuana or
another controlled substance, but that the drug dealer's spouse did not
know about, or took all reasonable steps to prevent, the illegal use of the
property. In that case, while the property would be subject to forfeiture in
its entirety on account of the drug dealer's illegal acts under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(aX7), 21 7 the court must exempt the property from forfeiture to the
extent of the interest of the innocent spouse.
This problem arises with even more frequency in criminal forfeiture
cases where only the defendant's interest in the property is subject to
forfeiture. Interests held by spouses or other third parties are automatically
21s The outcome of criminal forfeiture cases will remain unchanged. See United
States v. Infelise, 938 F. Supp. 1352, 1358 (N.D. IMI. 1996) (holding that wife was
not a bona fide purchaser of property husband placed in her name because she gave
nothing of value in exchange for the property), affidinpart, rev'dinpart, 159 F.3d
300 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sokolow, No. CRIM. 93-394-01, 1996 WL
32113, at*20-21 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26,1996) (concluding thatwifewas notabona fide
purchaser of property she received in a separation agreement and daughter was not
a bona fide purchaser because she received property as a gift knowing father had
been indicted).
216 18 U.S.CA. § 983(d)(5).
217 Section 881(a)(7) provides: "All real property, including any right, title, and
interest.., in the whole of any lot or tract of land.., which is used, or intended
to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission [of a
drug offense]" is subject to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994).
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exempted from forfeiture, even if the third party was fully aware of the
criminal acts and the way the property was used to facilitate them. '
How the court severs the property so as to allow the government to
realize its interest in the portion that is subject to forfeiture, while
exempting the interest of the innocent third party, turns, in part, on the
manner in which the property was held. If the property owners were
partners in a business, each with a fractional interest in the partnership
assets, and the interest of only one of the partners is subject to forfeiture,
the government succeeds to the "guilty" partner's interest, and finds itself
in partnership with the remaining partners.21 9 Similarly, if the property
owners are tenants in common, each with an undivided fractional interest
in the property, the court may order that the fraction held by the wrongdoer
Thus, in general, a tract of land that is used to facilitate a drug offense is
forfeited in its entirety, even if only a portion of the property was involved in the
commission of the offense. See 221 Dana Ave., 81 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (declining
to sever real property even though drug trafficking was confined to first floor of
two-story duplex), rev'd on other grounds, 239 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2001). Issues do
arise in § 88 1(a)(7) cases, of course, as to whether a given parcel is in fact a single
tract of land, or is really a composite of contiguous tracts. See United States v. 817
N.E. 29th Drive, Wilton Manors, 175 F.3d 1304, 1308-09 (1lth Cir. 1999)
(explaining that whether real property is forfeitable as a single parcel turns not on
description in deed or in land records, but on character of property where criminal
activity took place, and whether all of the land is of the same character, and
concluding that where two parcels constitute a residence and front yard both are
subject to forfeiture), cert. denied sub nom. Howerin v. United States, 528 U.S.
1083 (2000). The division or severance of the property in such cases turns on the
nature of the property itself and has nothing to do with exempting the interests of
an innocent owner. It is the latter issue, which constitutes an entirely separate
reason for severing the property, that is discussed in the text.
211 United States v. Kennedy, 201 F.3d 1324,1330-31 (1 lth Cir. 2000) (holding
that where husband and wife are tenants by the entireties, only husband's interest
is forfeitable in a criminal case); United States v. Norman, No. Crim. A. 95-86,
1999 WL 959254, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 1999) (discussing criminal forfeiture as
an in personam action that is part of defendant's sentence, so that only defendant's
property can be forfeited); United States v. Ida, 14 F. Supp. 2d 454,459 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (explaining that the effect ofa verdict of forfeiture is to put the government
in the shoes of the defendant, to succeed to whatever interest the defendant had in
the property and, because third parties are not parties to the criminal case, they
cannot be bound by the verdict of forfeiture).219 See United States v. Johnston, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1323 (M.D. Fla. 1998)
(ordering forfeiture of defendant's twenty-five percent interest in a general
partnership resulting in the government obtaining twenty-five percent interest in
partnership assets).
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be forfeited to the government, while the innocent parties retain the
remaining fraction."
In both of those situations, it is clear that the government obtains a
specific interest in the property, but it remains a co-owner. This is not an
ideal situation, and awkward, to say the least, if the government's new
partners turn out to be unsavory individuals engaged in a less than
respectable business, like the operation of a gambling club or a topless bar.
The situation is even more complicated if the property subject to
forfeiture is held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, or is
subject to an undivided 100% interest in a community property state. Some
courts hold that in these circumstances nothing can be forfeited if either the
husband or the wife is an innocent owner, because the right of the innocent
spouse to enjoy and alienate the property is necessarily changed by the
forfeiture of the other spouse's interest. 221 Other courts have converted the
tenancy by the entirety to a co-tenancy, substituting the government as a co-
tenant.' Still other courts have attempted to give the government a future
interest in the property that arises only if the marriage ends in such a way
that the guilty spouse acquires a 100% interest in the property.' But those
220 See United States v. Dethlefs, 934 F. Supp. 475, 478 (D. Me. 1996)
(explaining that ifdefendant's part of the property was used to commit an offense,
defendant's undivided one-quarter interest as tenant in commonwas implicated and
may be forfeited if defendant was convicted), affd sub nom. United States v.
White, 116 F.3d 948 (1st Cir. 1997).
221 See Christunas v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 2d 642, 643 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
(holding that no part of the property held by husband and wife as tenants by the
entireties can be forfeited in a criminal case unless both husband and wife are
convicted or consent to the forfeiture); cf United States v. Lee, 232 F.3d 556, 560-
61 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant's interest in property cannot be forfeited
as a substitute asset in a criminal case when held by defendant and wife as tenants
by the entirety because state law prohibits the transfer of one spouse's interest
without the other spouse's consent, but suggesting that the federal interest would
override state law if the property were directly involved in a crime).
I See United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1991)
(converting tenancy by the entireties to co-tenancy, with government substituted
as the co-tenant).
2 See United States v. Kennedy, 201 F.3d 1324, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that government's interest in one-half of property held as tenants by the
entireties cannot be realized during the marriage, but it can be realized when the
marriage ends, notwithstanding the attempt of one spouse to "seamlessly" transfer
his interest to the other); United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 972 F.2d 136, 138 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the government can never realize its interest in property
held as tenants by the entireties as long as the marriage continues, and it cannot
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courts are split over whether the government has the power to prevent the
husband and wife from frustrating the government's future interest by
arranging to transfer the property to the "innocent" spouse during the
marriage.2 4
In enacting § 983(dX5), Congress recognized that the only way to
resolve these issues-when physical severance of the property is not
feasible, and joint ownership of the property by the government and other
third parties is unwise-is to give federal courts the authority, irrespective
of state property law,' to order the liquidation of the property and to
distribute the proceeds between the government and the property owners.
Thus, § 983(dX5) gives the court three options: "A) sever the property; B)
liquidate the property and order the return of a portion of the proceeds to
the innocent party; or C) permit the innocent party to remain in possession
of the property, subject to a lien in favor of the government to the extent of
the guilty party's interest." ' 6
The first option obviously only works with types of property that can
be physically severed, such as a multi-acre farm. The third option gives the
court the power to transfer marital property to the innocent spouse, subject
to a lien in favor of the government. This makes clear what interest the
government has in such property, and it prevents the parties from
frustrating the government's future interest in the property by transferring
the property to the innocent spouse. However, it leaves both the innocent
spouse as well as the guilty one in possession of the property.
The best alternative in most cases will be to order the liquidation of the
property and to distribute the proceeds. Only by taking such action can the
court simultaneously protectthe interest of the innocent spouse, deprive the
guilty spouse of any right of access to the property, and allow the
government to realize its forfeitable interest.
defeat defendant's attempt to transfer his undivided interest to his spouse during
the marriage).
S24 ee cases cited supra note 223.
s Under the Supremacy Clause, courts will have the authority to impose any
of these alternatives notwithstanding the innocent spouse's property rights under
state marital property law. Cf United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, Wilton
Manors, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311 n.14 (lth Cir. 1999) (noting that under the
Supremacy Clause federal forfeiture trumps state homestead exemptions), cert.
deniedsub nom. Howerin v. United States, 528 U.S. 1083 (2000); United States v.
Walters, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1216 (D. Kan. 2000); Brewer v. United States (In re
Brewer), 209 B.R. 575, 577 (Bankr. S.D. FI. 1996).
=6 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(5) (West Supp. 2000).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The uniform innocent owner defense represents a conscientious effort
to provide protection for truly innocent property owners whose property
was used by another person to commit a criminal offense. Making the
defense uniform for all federal forfeiture actions and spelling out the details
of the defense as it applies to both pre-existing owners and those who
acquire their interest in the property after it is derived from or used to
commit the criminal offense will make the defense much easier to apply.
In turn, this will eliminate many of the ambiguities that caused a division
of judicial authority under pre-CAFRA law. No doubt, new ambiguities
lurk in the statutory language, but Congress has produced a fundamentally
sound structure that represents an enormous improvement over the old law.

